ORIGINALISM AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
GRANT DARWIN*
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has repeatedly asserted that same-sex marriage is an easy
question for originalism; it is clearly not within the Constitution’s purview. The purpose of this
Article is to challenge that claim by illustrating how an originalist could find that denying samesex marriage contravenes the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Article
finds that the original public meaning of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment may serve (1)
as a prohibition on systems of caste and class legislation, or (2) as a ban on partial or special
class legislation that singles out a group for a particular benefit or burden. As to the first
suggested meaning, this Article explores the scientific research on the psychobiological roots of
sexual orientation, particularly of gay men; the historical treatment of gay men under American
law; and areas of current legal inequality of same-sex couples, as compared to married differentsex couples. It also seeks to establish that a system of caste likely does exist, and that an
originalist may find denying same-sex marriage to be an unconstitutional perpetuation of that
system. As to the second suggested meaning, if the original public meaning of the Amendment is
to constitutionalize the antebellum practice of prohibiting laws which single out a group for a
special burden, this Article argues that an originalist may find denying same-sex marriage to be
an unconstitutionally targeted burden. The aim of this Article is not to impose upon originalism a
definitive answer to the same-sex marriage question, but rather to illustrate how an originalist
could legitimately find denying same-sex marriage to be unconstitutional. At the least, it
demonstrates that same-sex marriage demands of originalism deep consideration, and is not the
easy question Justice Scalia believes.
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INTRODUCTION
On December 7th, 2012, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to two
controversial cases relating to same-sex marriage: the first from the Ninth Circuit on California’s
Proposition Eight, and the second from the Second Circuit on the Federal Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA). 1 Predictably, the announcement has been met with much speculation about how
the nine Justices will cast their votes. 2
*J.D. Candidate, Class of 2014 at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1

Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, sub nom. Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct 786 (Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted,
133 S. Ct 786 (Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-307); see also Adam Liptak, Justices To Hear Two Challenges On Gay Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2012).
2

See, e.g., Jess Bravin, High Court Will Rule on Gay Marriage, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8-9, 2012, at
A9 (“The Supreme Court’s liberal wing—Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena
Kagan—is likely to treat the Defense of Marriage Act with skepticism. Conservative Justice Antonin Scalia is expected to
be more deferential to the law, probably joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Samuel Alito also typically takes
conservative positions on social issues.”); Richard D. Kahlenberg, The Arguments for Gay Marriage Undermine
Dec.
13,
2012,
Affirmative
Action,
SLATE,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/12/supreme_court_2012
_how_justice_kennedy_could_vote_to_recognize_gay_marriage.html (“Kennedy is likely to be the swing vote in these
cases, and many are predicting he will side with . . . liberals to support gay marriage.”); Adam Winkler, Will the Supreme
Court Uphold Gay Marriage Ban?, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 7, 2012, http://huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/will-thesupreme-court-up_b_2259342.html.
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Justice Antonin Scalia, for one, has not been shy about his views on gay rights issues. 3
Recently, discussing an array of controversial topics he asserted, “[t]he death penalty? Give me a
break. It’s easy. Abortion? Absolutely easy. Nobody ever thought the Constitution prevented
restrictions on abortion. Homosexual sodomy? Come on. For 200 years, it was criminal in every
state.” 4 Striking a similar chord in a 2009 interview, Justice Scalia remarked:
I do not propose or suggest that originalism is perfect. And provides easy
answers for everything. But that’s not my burden. My burden is just to show
that it’s better than anything else. And the originalist has easy answers for many
things. Especially the most controversial things in modern times. Whether . . .
the equal protection clause requires that the states permit same sex marriage. I
mean you know that’s not a hard question for an originalist. Nobody ever
thought that’s what the equal protection clause meant. . . . [I]t didn’t mean that
[at the time of ratification] . . . [and] it doesn’t mean that today. 5
Whether the issue is laws prohibiting intimate acts between same-sex couples or samesex marriage, Justice Scalia contends that it is an easy questions for an originalist; the
Constitution on its face does not prohibit laws from proscribing, nor would anyone at the time of
ratification have expected the equal protection clause to protect, such conduct. 6
Contrary to Justice Scalia’s assertion, this Article will show that same-sex marriage may
not be the easy question for originalism he believes it to be. To support this claim, the Article
will demonstrate how an originalist might find denying marriage to same-sex couples to be
unconstitutional. The aim is not to ascertain a definitive answer to the same-sex marriage
question, but rather to establish that this is a difficult question for originalism that demands
thorough consideration.
As described by Professor Larry Solum, originalism, “as a matter of lexicography . . . is a
While the broad term
family resemblance term—with several overlapping senses.” 7
3

See, e.g., Elizabeth Chuck, Gay Student Asks Justice Scalia to Defend his ‘Bestiality’
Comments, NBC NEWS, Dec. 11, 2012, http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/12/11/15841049-gay-student-asksjustice-scalia-to-defend-his-bestiality-comments?lite (reporting how just a few days after the Court announced it would
hear the same-sex marriage cases, Justice Scalia came under fire for his response to a gay student’s question while
speaking at Princeton University in defense of his controversial dissent in Lawrence v. Texas. In Lawrence, refuting the
majority’s overruling of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986), Justice Scalia wrote that “[s]tate laws against bigamy,
same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are . . .
sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices.” 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Scalia explained that by equating laws banning “homosexual sodomy” to those banning bestiality and murder
he aimed to prompt the question, “if we cannot have moral feelings against or objections to homosexuality, can we have it
against anything?”); see also Caleb Kennedy, Scalia Defends Gay Rights Position, DAILY PRINCETONIAN, Dec. 11, 2012,
http://dailyprincetonian.com/2012/12/10/32135/.
4

Mark Sherman, Scalia Says Abortion, Gay Rights are Easy Cases, ASSOC. PRESS, Oct. 5,
2012, http://news.yahoo.com/scalia-says-abortion-gay-rights-easy-cases-073501926.html.
5

Interview by Peter Robinson with Antonin Scalia, Supreme Court Justice (Feb. 23, 2009),
available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/uk_scalia_transcript.pdf (emphasis added); see also
Common Knowledge, Law and Justice with Antonin Scalia, YOUTUBE, Mar. 16, 2009, http://youtu.be/zE9biZT_z1k.
6

Interview by Peter Robinson, supra note 5 (“Nobody ever thought that’s what the equal
protection clause meant [that states are required to permit same-sex marriage].”); see also Sherman, supra note 4.
7

Lawrence B. Solum, What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory
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“originalism” is ambiguous, 8 the tie that binds these various senses is a desire to constrain the
latitude of judicial discretion on constitutional matters, or more forcefully, to constrain judicial
activism. 9 It is how a particular brand of originalism defines fidelity that has prompted
divergence.
For the purposes of this Article I will put to the side the more restrictive forms of
originalism—original intent and original understanding originalism 10—and focus on the brand of
originalism practiced by Justice Scalia, which has been referred to by some as the “New
Originalism,” 11 but more often and more descriptively has been identified as “original public
meaning” originalism. 12 Original public meaning originalism marked a shift from intent-focused
forms of originalism. 13 Rather than center its analysis on the subjective intentions of the framers
or ratifiers, most originalists today accept that the meaning of the Constitution is the objective
meaning that the words were given at the time of that particular article’s or amendment’s
ratification. 14

5 (Georgetown Univ. L. Ctr.,Working Paper, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1825543 [hereinafter Solum,
What is Originalism?].
8

Id. at 6; see also Thomas Colby, The Sacrifice of New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 718
(2011) (“It would be a mistake to view either the Old or the New Originalism as a distinct and coherent constitutional
theory; ‘originalism’ is a label that has been, and continues to be, affixed to a remarkably diverse array of interpretive
theories that in fact share surprisingly little in common.”).
9

See Solum, What is Originalism?, supra note 7, at 41 (“‘Originalism’ is an ambiguous term.
The family of contemporary originalist constitutional theories contains substantial diversity, and there may be no single
thesis upon which all self-described originalists agree.”); see also Colby, supra note 8, at 714 (“Originalism was born of a
desire to constrain judges. Judicial constraint was its heart and soul—its raison d’être.”); James E. Fleming, The
Balkinization of Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 670 (2012) (“[T]here are numerous varieties of originalism,
and . . . the only thing they agree upon is their rejection of moral readings.”).
10

Colby identifies these forms of Originalism, which focused predominantly on the intentions
of the framers or the subjective understandings of the ratifiers, as “Old Originalism.” Colby, supra note 8, at 719-720.
Colby explains,
the theoretical moves from the Old to the New Originalism [include]: (a) the move from original
intent to original meaning; (b) the move from subjective meaning to objective meaning; (c) the
move from actual to hypothetical understanding; (d) the embrace of standards and general
principles; (e) the embrace of broad levels of generality; (f) the move from original expected
application to original objective principles; (g) the distinction between interpretation and
construction; and (h) the distinction between normative and semantic originalism.
Id. I put these brands of originalism aside because it is almost certain that Old Originalism, which has been criticized for
being irreconcilable with integrated schools, interracial marriage, and gender equality, could not sanction same-sex
marriage. To attempt to prove otherwise is not a useful endeavor, especially considering that the most relevant jurist to
this piece, Justice Scalia, does not embrace those methods.
11

See, e.g., Colby, supra note 8, at 714 (“The advocates of this new and improved originalism
have self-consciously adopted a new label—’the New Originalism’—to distinguish their theory from its failed
forerunner.”). See generally Keith Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004).
12

Solum, What is Originalism?, supra note 7, at 16.

13

Colby, supra note 8, at 721-24; see also Lawrence Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 928 (2009) [hereinafter Solum, Heller and Originalism].
14

Solum, Heller and Originalism, supra note 13, at 928, 933; see also Lawrence B. Solum, The
Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 116 (2010) [hereinafter Solum, InterpretationConstruction] (“[T]he linguistic meaning of the constitution is fixed by linguistic facts at the time that each constitutional

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol16/iss3/3

2013]

ORIGINALISM AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

241

On the whole, New Originalists agree that where the text lays out a straightforward
rule—for instance, the President must be at least thirty-five years old—courts should simply apply
that rule. 15 Many further contend that when the text lays out a broad standard or principle, the
objective meaning of the principle or standard controls interpretation. 16 Some New Originalists
also argue that though the meaning of a principle or standard was set at the time of ratification,
when applying that principle or standard to a modern set of facts, modern interpreters need not
adhere to how it would have been expected to apply by the public living at the time of
ratification. 17
Applying an original public meaning originalist interpretation, one may determine that
the objective original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is to serve as a broad prohibition on
systems of caste and class legislation. If sexual orientation qualifies as such a caste-like feature,
then legislation and regulation based on that feature may be unconstitutional.
In Part I, I define the version of original meaning originalism I employ, explain how it is
distinct from original expected applications, and discuss how original meaning originalism
functions. In Part II, I address the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Consistent
with the work of originalist scholars who have examined the issue, I will argue that the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is to establish a prohibition on systems of caste and/or
class legislation. In Part III, I identify three interrelated features of a system of caste: (1) a
hereditary characteristic is implicated; (2) legislation and regulation creates class stratification
based on that characteristic; and (3) such stratification leads to the exclusive allocation of rights to
one group at the expense of another. To these features I apply scientific research on sexual

provision is framed and ratified.”).
15

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; David Strauss, Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. REV.
1161, 1164 (2012) (“Rules are ‘determinate’; the examples are that a President must be thirty-five years old and that there
are two houses of Congress.”).
16

See Colby, supra note 8, at 722-24 (discussing the transition of originalism’s focus on
subjective to objective original meaning); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1132 (explaining that original meaning should be found by identifying what
an objective, reasonably well-informed reader at the time of ratification “within the political and linguistic community in
which they were adopted” would have understood the text to mean).
17

See Jack Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT
427, 449 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Constitutional Redemption] (“Fidelity to original meaning did not require following
what the framing generation thought the consequences of adopting the words would be. That is especially so when the text
employs abstract principles.”); Randy Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 622 (1999)
(“While some originalists still search for how the relevant generation of ratifiers expected or intended their textual
handiwork would be applied to specific cases, original meaning originalists need not concern themselves with this, except
as circumstantial evidence of what the more technical words and phrases in the text might have meant to a reasonable
listener.”); Stephen Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 669
(2009) (“What judges must be faithful to is the enacted law, not the expectations of the parties who wrote the law. . . .
Ordinary citizens could not have been expected to know what these original expected applications [of constitutional text]
were, and they could not have responded to them even if they had.”); see also, Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The
Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569 (1998). But see Colby, supra note 8, at 772 (identifying that some of
those who have endorsed original meaning and rejected original intent have not “bought into the notion that the proper
search is for the objective understandings of a hypothetical observer” and some originalists “continue to search for the
actual understandings of the actual ratifiers or public”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract
Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737, 742 (2012) (criticizing drawing inferences from abstract language in the
constitutional text).
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orientation to support the argument that same-sex attraction, particularly for men, is at least in
part hereditary. There is a history of legislation and regulation which distinguished gay men and
lesbian women from heterosexual persons, thus stratifying American society based on sexual
orientation, and there remain today significant areas where rights are exclusively allocated to
opposite-sex couples at the expense of same-sex couples, particularly among the bundle of rights
associated with marriage. 18 Finally in Part IV, I explain how if sexual orientation is a caste-like
feature, then denying marriage to same-sex couples violates the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Alternatively, I address how the same result is achieved if the original
meaning is to serve as a prohibition on class legislation that singles out a group for a special
benefit or burden.
I. ORIGINAL MEANING ORIGINALISM AND ITS INTERPRETATIVE METHODS
In this part, I explain how original meaning originalism operates as a method of
constitutional interpretation. The methodology illustrated here will supply the framework for the
analysis conducted in subsequent sections. As explained above, original meaning originalism is
the idea that the true meaning of the Constitution, to which we owe our fidelity, is the original
public meaning of the constitutional text. 19 One challenge originalism continues to face is that
any mode of constitutional interpretation that cannot encompass certain precedents, 20 notably
Brown v. Board of Education, 21 is unacceptable to modern majorities. 22 Faced with an original
meaning that is irreconcilable with modern societal norms, even Justice Scalia famously admitted
he himself might prove merely a “faint-hearted originalist.” 23 Many New Originalists, though not

18

The discussion of historical legal treatment and scientific research in Part III is largely
focused on gay men. This is not a choice to set aside other members of the broader LGBT community, but rather the
consequence of where the attention of history and science has predominantly focused. The history of the LGBT
community in the United States, especially its legal history, is multi-faceted and complex. Such a history requires
examination through a number of lenses (e.g., race, gender, economic status) to develop a complete understanding. Much
of the true history of LGBT individuals in the United States will never be known. See JOEY L. MOGUL ET AL., QUEER
(IN)JUSTICE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 19 (2011).
19

Solum, What is Originalism?, supra note 7, at 16.

20

The role of precedent has often presented a unique source of tension for originalism.
Compare Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 24 (1994) (“[T]he
practice of following precedent is . . . affirmatively inconsistent with the federal Constitution.”), with Henry P. Monaghan,
Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 772 (1988) (“[T]o accord status to stare decisis
requires an acknowledgement that originalism plays a purely instrumental role by contributing to the establishment of
legitimate government, which in turn promotes stability and continuity . . . [but] [a]t this point in our history, when
adherence to stare decisis promotes the underlying values of stability and continuity better than does adherence to the
original understanding, the latter cannot prevail.”).
21

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

22

Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1192 (2012); see also, e.g.,
Strauss, supra note 15, at 1162 (citing Brown as the prime example of what he coins the “originalist [plausibility]
dilemma”); Randy Barnett, Originalism and Brown, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 12, 2005, 2:05 PM),
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2005_05_08-2005_05_14.shtml#1115921115.
23

Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989) (“I hasten
to confess that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot imagine myself . . . upholding a statute that
imposes the punishment of flogging.”).
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Justice Scalia, 24 have sought “to put originalism on a stronger theoretical footing” in two key
ways: by recognizing that (1) where the text is vague, the Constitution requires both semantic
interpretation and construction, and (2) the Constitution contains clear rules, as well as
purposefully broad principles and standards. 25
New Originalist scholars such as Randy Barnett and Keith Whittington explain that to
“interpret” the Constitution means to ascertain its semantic meaning, whereas construction entails
“the application of . . . meaning . . . to particular circumstances.” 26 They have shifted away from
the sort of original public meaning originalism practiced by Justice Scalia that strictly focuses on
the “enterprise of discerning the semantic content of the Constitution” and toward a method of
constitutional construction that strictly applies the objective original public meaning of the text
when semantically clear, but allows for “judicial specification of constitutional doctrine when the
text is vague.” 27 Barnett explains it is an “inescapable fact” that the Constitution is “objectively
24

Neither Justice Scalia nor Justice Thomas has embraced the steps taken by Barnett and
Balkin. In general, though “Justice Scalia . . . championed the move from original intent to original meaning, [he] has not
said much about most of the other New Originalist moves. Justice Thomas is even further behind; he has not even
consistently or explicitly acknowledged that the proper search is for the original public meaning rather than the original
intent of the Framers.” Colby, supra note 8, at 772. Recently, Justice Scalia expressly rejected construction in his book
Reading Law, which he co-authored with Southern Methodist University Law School Professor Bryan Garner. ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 13-15 (2012). See also Michael
Ramsey, Scalia & Garner on Interpretation and Construction, THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (Dec. 31, 2012, 7:00 A.M.),
http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2012/12/scalia-garner-on-interpretation-and-constructionmichaelramsey.html (quoting from Reading Law where Antonin Scalia rejects construction). In addition to Garner, other
academic originalists, notably Professors John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, have rejected construction. See John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory Of Interpretation and the Case Against
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 752 (2009). McGinnis and Rappaport assert that the “original methods approach”
they propose “stands in sharp contrast to the theories of constitutional construction” embraced by “‘new originalism.’” Id.
They conclude that they can “find no support for constitutional construction.” Id.
25

Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 17, at 448; Strauss, supra note 15, at 1164
(describing Balkin’s distinction between “interpretation” and “construction”); see also Greenberg & Litman, supra note
17, at 617-19 (concluding that scholars must interpret the Constitution while also rejecting some of these original
practices); Solum, Heller and Originalism, supra note 13, at 928-29 (summarizing Paul Brest’s criticisms of intent based
originalism in his text The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980): “Brest’s
article advanced a variety of criticisms of original intentions originalism, including: (1) the difficulty of ascertaining the
institutional intention of a multimember body in general; (2) the particular problems associated with identifying the
intention of the members of Philadelphia Convention and the various state ratifying conventions in the case of the original
Constitution and of Congress and the various state legislatures in the case of amendments; (3) the problem of determining
the level of generality or specificity of the Framers’ and ratifiers’ intentions; (4) the problem of inferring intentions from
constitutional structure; (5) the difficulty of translating the Framers’ and ratifiers’ beliefs and values given changes in
circumstances over time; (6) the problem of the democratic legitimacy—i.e., that the Constitution of 1789 was drafted and
ratified without the participation of women and slaves; and (7) the problem of instability, in that an inflexible
constitutional order cannot adapt to changing circumstances.”).
26

Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 615, 631 (2009) [hereinafter Barnett, Misconceived Assumption].
27

Solum, What is Originalism?, supra note 7, at 16; see also Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation
and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 67, 70 (2011) (“Where the semantic meaning of the text provides
enough information to resolve a particular issue about constitutionality . . . construction will look indistinguishable in
practice from interpretation. . . . But . . . there is not always enough information to resolve a particular issue without
something more. . . . A constitution with a degree of vagueness delegates some decisions of application to the judgment of
future actors . . . .”).
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open-ended in many instances”; to deny that reality and the need for construction is “in fact to
defy the original meaning of the Constitution.” 28
In a similar vein, Professor Lawrence Solum distinguishes between interpretation and
construction as “mark[ing] the difference between linguistic meaning and legal effect.” 29 He
recognizes “the fact of constitutional underdeterminacy,” or that “the original meaning of the text
does not fully determine constitutional doctrine or its application to particular cases.” 30 Where
the text fails to dictate how it should be applied to a particular case, construction is needed. 31
Professor Jack Balkin has also embraced this notion of constitutional construction. 32 He
uses it as a means to reconcile original public meaning originalism with Supreme Court decisions
creating socially progressive, non-originalist precedent. 33 For Balkin, “[i]f the text states a
determinate rule, we must apply the rule in today’s circumstances. If it states a standard, we must
apply the standard. And if it states a general principle, we must apply the principle.” 34 Where the
text sets out a general principle (like “equal protection”), his version of original meaning
originalism requires discerning underlying principles, which he defines as “aids or heuristics that
help us flesh out the textual commitment to [the] moral or legal principle that we find in the
text.” 35 Underlying principles, “underlie the text because they both support the text and explain
the point of the text.” 36 These underlying principles enable us to understand the principle stated
in the text itself. We can engage in construction by applying that principle to a novel set of facts,
precipitating different “legal effects.” 37

28

Colby, supra note 8, at 725-26 (citing Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of
“Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 11-13 (2006)).
29
30
31

Solum, Interpretation-Construction, supra note 14, at 95.
Solum, What is Originalism?, supra note 7, at 16.
Solum, Interpretation-Construction, supra note 14, at 106-107.

32

Professor Balkin predicts in his book LIVING ORIGINALISM 118 (2011), and reiterates in his
article The Distribution of Political Faith, that “it [is] only a matter of time before some very clever conservative
originalist tried to show that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment protects homosexuals as well as blacks
and women. If gay rights ever become as taken for granted as racial and sexual equality, then conservative originalists will
have to show why the Constitution’s original meaning, rightly understood, has always implicitly protected the rights of
homosexuals (at least when one controls for changes in factual context).” 71 MD. L. REV. 1144, 1158 (2012). Without
claiming myself to be all that clever, I endeavor to meet Professor Balkin’s predictions in this piece.
33

See generally, e.g., Jack Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291
(2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Original Meaning] (arguing that anti-abortion laws violated the original public meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibitions against class legislation and its principle of equal citizenship); Steven G. Calabresi
& Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011) (situating laws banning sex
discrimination as applications of the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on caste systems).
34

Colby, supra note 8, at 726 (citing Jack Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living
Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 553 (2009)).
35
36

Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 17, at 493.
Id.

37

Solum, What is Originalism?, supra note 7, at 16; see also Calabresi & Fine, supra note 17,
at 665-75 (noting that “Professor Balkin is certainly right that the Constitution contains clauses like the Necessary and
Proper or the Section Five power that employ standards and not rules” and discussing more general points of agreement
with Balkin). In Constitutional Redemption, Balkin softens on the degree to which a principle is fixed. He explains,
[in] Abortion and Original Meaning I spent considerable time trying to show that the particular
principles I relied on . . . had a strong pedigree in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . But,
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The semantic meaning of the text is fixed at the time each provision of the Constitution
was framed. 38 When the text sets out a clear rule, application is straightforward; when the text
sets out a vague principle, construction is often required. Either way, modern issues are placed
beneath the lens of a fixed, objective meaning.
A. Distinguishing Objective Original Meaning and Expected Applications
One area where original public meaning originalists diverge is whether objective
meaning implicates original expected applications. As explained above, original meaning
requires “fidelity to the words of the text, understood in terms of their original meaning, and to
the principles that underlie the text.” 39 The objective meaning does not change with shifts in how
“language assigns concepts to words.” 40 For example, as Professor Balkin explains, the language
“against domestic violence” in Article IV Section 4, means “riots or disturbances within a state”
and not “assaults and batteries by intimates or by persons living in the same household.” 41 To
apply a later developing definition of the words would alter the meanings and underlying
principles of the constitutional text, which is impermissible. The meanings of the words and
underlying principles were solidified at ratification and, “we are bound by the value judgments
that appear [in] the text’s original public meaning.” 42
In contrast, adhering to original expected applications 43 is the idea that fidelity to
“original meaning means not only adhering to original meaning of the constitutional text and the
meanings of the words at the time they were adopted,” but also that “the concepts and principles
underlying [the] words must be applied in the same way that they would have been applied when
as I shall now argue, neither living constitutionalism nor original meaning originalism requires that
all constitutional principles must have been specifically intended by some group of framers or
ratifiers.
Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 17, at 487. Where one could infer from Calabresi’s methodology in
Originalism and Sex Discrimination that a principle is fixed as far as it was understood and endorsed by the public at the
time of ratification, Balkin contends that “original meaning originalism [does not] require that all constitutional principles
must have been specifically intended by some group of framers or ratifiers” and that we look to history “to derive
underlying principles, even (and perhaps especially) principles that nobody in particular intended.” Id. Balkin explains
that historical evidence helps us construct principles, but cautions that when deriving principles from statements of various
framers and ratifiers, we must be wary of their expected applications of the text. Id. at 493. In the least, it appears that
Balkin still embraces the notion that the principles must be present at the time of ratification.
38

Solum, What is Originalism?, supra note 7, at 29 (explaining the “fixation thesis” and
arguing that meaning was fixed at ratification).
39

Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 33, at 295; see also Balkin, Constitutional Redemption,
supra note 17, at 429. But see Richard Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103
NW U. L. REV. 702, 723-25 (2009) (arguing that “relying on an artificial concept instead of on an actual historical event
inevitably enlarges the field of . . . imaginative reconstructions” and criticizing Balkin’s approach for a lack of constraint
and room for imagination).
40
41

Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 17, at 430.
Id. at 430.

42

Jack Balkin, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, or, How Thick is Original Public
Meaning? BALKINIZATION (Dec. 8, 2011, 5:55 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/12/originalism-and-sexdiscrimination-or.html (“[W]e are bound by the value judgments that appear [sic] the text’s original public meaning—
which includes the ban on caste and class legislation—but we are not bound by their factual mistakes today.”).
43

Fleming, supra note 9, at 671.
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[the constitutional text was] adopted.” 44 Those who focus on original expected applications
“ask[] how people living at the time the text was adopted would have expected [that the
Constitution] would be applied using language in its ordinary sense (along with any legal terms of
art).” 45 For example, were society to find capital punishment ethically and scientifically beyond
justification, original expected applications would nonetheless require finding the practice
constitutional because the public at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified would have
interpreted and expected the constitutional text not to prohibit capital punishment.
Originalists like Professors Balkin and Calabresi embrace the idea that when interpreting
the Constitution we should not be constrained by the way the public would have applied
principles established at the time of that particular article or amendment’s ratification. 46
Conflating non-binding expected application with binding original meaning is considered by
some to be problematic, 47 and by others to be in fact “less faithful to the constitution” by
entrenching a set of historical rules. 48 This Article will largely follow the lead of those who
refuse to treat expected applications as binding.
Yet, expectations are often indicative of meaning. 49 It may very well be that even if we
are not expressly bound by the expected applications of the past, the past’s expectations heavily
influence our interpretation. Thus, the relationship between expected application and meaning
44
45
46

Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 33, at 296.
Id.
Calabresi and Matthews provide a useful example of this distinction:

Suppose Congress passed a statute that said the colors of the American flag were to be red, white,
and blue, but that many statements in the congressional record indicate that important Members of
Congress understood the word “blue” to mean “green.” Suppose further that the public understood
the word “blue” to mean “blue” in accordance with its commonly accepted public meaning. The
color of the flag in this case would be red, white, and blue notwithstanding Congress’s intent that
‘blue’ actually means “green.” We are governed by the formal legal texts that Congress enacts into
law and not by the un-enacted intentions of the Members of Congress who wrote those texts. For the
same reason, we are governed by the laws our ancestors made during Reconstruction and not by
their un-enacted intentions or expectations when they made those laws.
Steven Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1393, 1397 (2012).
47

Balkin argues that the linguistic meaning of a text and the “expectations about the application
of that meaning to future cases” are quite separate things. Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 33, at 292-93. In his view,
an approach focused on original expected applications is difficult to reconcile with important “genuine achievements of
American constitutionalism” such as “equal rights for women” or “greater freedom of speech.” Id. at 299-300.
Originalists who focus on the Original Expected Applications regard these achievements as interpretive mistakes, and
though “maintain them out of grudging acceptance,” are aggravated by what they deem to be “deviations . . . that sacrifice
legitimacy and legality.” Id. Consequently, Balkin contends that an interpretative method that cannot embrace those
achievements is untenable and that original meaning is not so limited. Id. But see Balkin, Constitutional Redemption,
supra note 17, at 435-36 (recognizing that Original Meaning Originalism does not always guarantee “happy endings”).
48

Comparing Balkin’s method of text and principle with an original expected applications
approach, Fleming contends “[t]he upshot of his analysis is that original-expected-applications originalism is inherently
revisionist. Because of its substantive (conservative), institutional (restraint), and jurisprudential (rule of law as a law of
rules) commitments, original expected applications originalism revises the Constitution from our charter of abstract
aspirational principles into a code of concrete historical rules – rather than being faithful to it.” Fleming, supra note 9, at
674.
49

Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 33, at 303 (“[O]riginal expected application . . . helps
us understand the original meaning of the text and the general principles that animated the text.”).
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could nonetheless make it difficult to find sexual orientation a caste-like feature protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. If the public could not have expected “equal protection” to extend to
individuals sexually oriented toward those of their same gender, how can one derive a meaning
that authorizes same-sex marriage? One response would be that we identify principles that are as
general as the text itself. Insight gained from expectations about what equal protection means
would not necessarily embrace or exclude gay men and lesbian women (especially considering
the concept of same-sex attraction did not even exist at that time). 50 In the least, the difficulty of
ascertaining the degree to which expectation influences the definition of a principle supports the
reality that this is not an “easy question” for originalism.
B. Why Original Meaning Originalism?
The brand of original meaning originalism embraced by New Originalists like Balkin,
Calabresi, and Solum appears to accept constitutional underdeterminacy. 51
For them,
interpretation involves deriving principles and applying them to novel factual scenarios. 52 Where
the text is “general, abstract, or offers a standard,” a decision was made by the adopters to voice a
principle rather than a rigid rule, therein allowing later generations to take and apply the principle
to present-day circumstances. 53 While the text itself cannot be changed (absent an Article V
amendment), 54 application of the general principle it establishes can shift with how our
understanding of facts changes with time. 55 Essentially, “[w]hat words mean is one thing; what
we should do about their meaning is another.” 56
To flesh out principles from ambiguous text we can look to external resources, such as
newspapers or statements by the framers or adopters, to reverse-engineer that principle. 57 Thus,
50
51

See infra Part III(C).
Solum, What is Originalism?, supra note 7, at 16.

52

Id. at 17; see also Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 33, at 293 (“The task of
interpretation is to look to original meaning and underlying principles to determine how best to apply them in the current
circumstance.”)
53

Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 33, at 305. See generally Balkin, Constitutional
Redemption, supra note 17 (further explaining the functionality of his approach and asserting that fidelity to the
Constitution requires adhering to both precise rules and underlying principles).
54

U.S. CONST. art. V.

55

Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 33, at 293, 295. In its initial inception, Balkin dubbed
his approach the model of “text and principle.” Id. In his method we look first to the original meaning of the words—the
public meaning of words of the text at the time of enactment. Id. at 293. Where “the text is relatively rule-like, concrete
and specific, the underlying principles cannot override the textual command.” Id. at 305. When the text is not obviously
clear, “where [it is] abstract, general or offers a standard, we must look to the principles that underlie the text to make
sense of and apply it.” Id. Balkin contends that the model of text and principle enables “each generation of Americans
[to] seek to persuade each other about how the text and its underlying principles should apply to their circumstances, their
problems, and their grievances.” Id. at 301. In Constitutional Redemption, supra note 17, Balkin expands on the latitude
one has when deriving principles.
56

Colby, supra note 8, at 736 (quoting Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 30 (Univ. of
Ill. Coll. of Law Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 07-24, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244); see also Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and
Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1823 (1997) (distinguishing between interpretation and adjudication).
57

Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 33, at 303; Solum, What is Originalism?, supra note 7,
at 19; see also, Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 46, at 3 (“Originalists believe the constitutional text should be
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“[t]he inquiry is still a historical one, but one that is designed to uncover the level of generality at
which the constitutional terms would have been objectively understood by reasonable observers at
the time of the framing.” 58 This process demonstrates how original expected applications can
influence what we ascertain to be the original meaning.
Calling on the philosophy of language, Christopher Green illustrates a similar division. 59
Green explains that any word, sign, or expression is a “proper name” that “expresses its sense”
and “refers to or designates its referent.” 60 The sense of a word gives the word its cognitive
value. 61 A sense is strictly conveyed and expressed by language alone, and consequently is
fixed. 62 In contrast, the referent, the thing in the world the word picks out, can change based on a
different individual’s application of the sense of the word. 63 A word’s sense determines its
reference. 64 Green explains that while the “sense of the constitutional language [is] . . . fixed, the
reference of that language depends on particular facts.” 65 The framers solidified the sense of the
words, expressions, and principles in the constitutional text. 66 This is a function into which we as
a society insert facts to derive a referent for our time. 67 We are thus not bound to how the framers
would have understood facts when our modern knowledge of those facts dictates a different
outcome. 68 Green also recognizes the value in original expected applications (what he calls
original reference) as useful means of reverse engineering from an out-of-date application the
sense of the constitutional language. 69
Original meaning originalism is an evolving interpretive method. Construction enables
its adherents to preserve fidelity to the Constitution, but also to extend principles found where the
objective meaning of the text fails to provide a clear rule of decision that is capable of resolving
some modern dispute. Allowing individuals in a same-sex relationship to marry would have been
unthinkable at the time of ratification. Yet, if the Fourteenth Amendment sets out a principle, the
objective original meaning of which is to serve as a ban on caste and/or class legislation, then by
interpreted according to the original meaning of the words used as the meaning would have been unveiled in contemporary
dictionaries, grammar books, and other indicia of objective public meaning.”); Greenberg & Litman, supra note 17, at 617
(“[O]nce we are committed to interpreting the grand, general clauses of the Constitution as standing for abstract principles,
original practices will have an important role as evidence of the principles . . . .”).
58

Colby, supra note 8, at 727.

59

See generally Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 555 (2006) (Analyzing whether the philosophy of language can change overtime). In addition to Gottlob
Frege’s sense-reference distinction, Green also looks at similar, though not synonymous, theories of philosophy of
language, including John Stuart Mill’s distinction between connotation and denotation and Rudolph Carnap’s distinction
between intentions and extensions. At risk of oversimplifying these philosophies, all essentially distinguish how the
meaning of a word can be fixed while the facts known in a particular historical moment can change the outcome of the
meaning’s application.
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. at 563.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 560.
Id.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 595.
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engaging in construction it may be possible to extend the Amendment’s protection to prohibit
class legislation or a system of caste that is focused on sexual orientation.
II. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AS A BAN ON
SYSTEMS OF CASTE AND CLASS LEGISLATION
This part explores the original meaning of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment
and finds it to be a ban on class legislation and systems of caste. 70 I lean, in part, on the work of
Professors Balkin and Calabresi who have previously explored the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment in great detail.
The text of Section One reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. 71
The language of Section One is both abstract and broad. 72 It appears to reserve “equality
before the law”—an ambiguous concept, and one that is “no less ambiguous . . . [than] phrases
[like] privileges or immunities, [and] due process.” 73 The language also does not limit the class

70

See Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 33, at 315-16; Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33,
at 17; see also John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1413 (1992).
Harrison recognizes that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to put an end to such laws, to “abolish[] all class
legislation in the States and [do] away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to
another.” Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866)); see also Stephen
Calabresi, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Guarantee Equal Justice for All?, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 149
(2011) (“I agree with John Harrison that the Amendment bans all forms of caste-like discrimination.”). Additionally,
Harrison finds that the Fourteenth Amendment extends beyond just race to include “ad hoc castes or castes-in-context—
criteria that are not commonly employed but that nevertheless represent a division of the citizenry into classes for reasons
unrelated to the content of fundamental rights.” Id. at 1459.
But see, e.g., Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 1020
(1998). Boyce remarks,
[a]ny attempt to ground modern Fourteenth Amendment doctrine in original understanding
inevitably confronts two intractable obstacles. First, the historical record is too sparse to permit
confident conclusions about any of the most difficult and contentious questions of Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. . . . The original understanding can hardly account for the school
desegregation decisions of the 1950s, let alone the voting rights, gender discrimination, and privacy
decisions that were to follow in subsequent decades.
Id. He goes on to find that “[f]rom the historical evidence, it is not at all clear that the Fourteenth Amendment was
originally understood to embody a general prohibition of racial discrimination . . . let alone a prohibition general enough to
encompass discrimination based on sex or alienage.” Id. at 1024.
71
72
73

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (emphasis added).
Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 15.
Id.
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of protected citizens—all “citizen[s] of the United States” are protected. 74 The abstractness of the
language may indicate that Section One does not state a clear rule, but instead voices a principle
that one must flesh out from indicators beyond the constitutional text.
According to Balkin, Section One guarantees equal protection from various, often
interrelated, kinds of unequal treatment: (1) “legislation that made arbitrary and unreasonable
distinctions between citizens or persons,” (2) “‘special’ or ‘partial’ legislation that picked out a
group for special benefits or special burdens,” (3) “legislation that created or maintained a
disfavored caste or subordinated a group through law,” and (4) “legislation that selectively
restricted or abridged basic rights of citizenship and that therefore treated people as second-class
citizens.” 75 Likewise, Calabresi and Julia Rickert identify the original meaning of Section One as
“a rule against class legislation and systems of caste.” 76 They find that the “framers themselves
were vexingly silent on the independent operation of Section One’s clause,” and instead, “tended
to explain that Section One [on the whole] would guarantee equality and ban caste without getting
more specific.” 77 Calabresi and Rickert argue
What matters is (1) that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment drafted an
amendment to forbid legislation that prohibits all systems of caste and of classbased laws that were not justly prescribed for the general good of the whole
people; (2) that they used language broad enough to carry out their intention;
and (3) that contemporary readers generally understood the amendment to
mandate equality under the law by forbidding caste. 78
However, given the historical context surrounding ratification, some have suggested that
Section One applies only to race. 79 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was adopted in response to
74
75
76

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 33, at 315-16.
Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 17.

77

Calabresi and Rickert do not attempt to define the proper textual source for the ban on caste
and class legislation. Id. at 19-20. Rather, they find that the framers’ silence on the independent operation of the different
sections of the Fourteenth Amendment does not negate the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment on the whole prohibits
caste and class legislation. Id. Thus, as a practical matter, it is unnecessary to delve into the debate over whether the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection or Privileges and Immunities Clauses controls.
To briefly explain that debate, the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause was mutilated by
the Supreme Court’s decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). It is argued that the Slaughterhouse Cases
had the effect of jumbling the rights and powers set out in the Fourteenth Amendment. In his widely cited piece,
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, John Harrison contends that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
was crafted to “require that every state give the same privileges and immunities of state citizenship—the same positive law
rights of property, contract, and so forth—to all of its citizens.” Harrison, supra note 70, at 1388. The Equal Protection
Clause, on the other hand, “requires that the law, whatever it is, be the same for all citizens.” Id. The debate centers on
whether the Court should overrule the Slaughterhouse Cases and resurrect the Privilege and Immunities Clause with an
eye toward this original function.
78

Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 23; see also Green, supra note 59, at 602-03. Green
comments that a resurrected Privileges and Immunities Clause may be the proper source of a “no-caste” principle, citing as
evidence post-Slaughterhouse cases like Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), which rooted its holding in the
Equal Protection Clause but based much of its rhetoric and reasoning on the privileges of citizenship.
79

See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 407 (1977) (“[H]istorical records all but incontrovertibly establish that the framers of the
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growing predominance of “Black Codes” in the Southern states, which sought to re-impose on
freed blacks the restrictions on civil rights that existed prior to emancipation. 80 The “evil of [the
codes] was that they abridged, shortened or lessened the fundamental rights of a class of
people . . . creating a racial caste system of the South.” 81 Responding to this system and
concerned about the rights of the newly freed, the Framers sought to craft an Amendment that
would prevent a race-based caste system. 82 Therefore, one might argue that the Fourteenth
Amendment simply constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and thus only protects from
race-based caste systems.
Though at a bare minimum the Fourteenth Amendment must be understood as
constitutionalizing the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 83 it likely extends further than race. 84 The
ambiguous language of the Amendment on its face may indicate that the meaning is not limited to
race, and the ratification history seems to support a finding that it accounts for more than only the
racial caste system established by the Black Codes. 85
One piece of evidence that supports this argument is the Amendment’s drafting history,
particularly changes in language between successive drafts. Calabresi and Rickert assert that
from the beginning, the Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction had a motive broader than a

Fourteenth Amendment excluded both suffrage and segregation from its reach: they confined it to protection of carefully
enumerated rights against State discrimination, deliberately withholding federal power to supply those rights where they
were not granted by the State to anybody, white or black.”); id. at 46 (“[T]he purpose of the framers was to protect blacks
from discrimination with respect to specified ‘fundamental rights,’ enumerated in the Civil Rights Act.”).
Berger is emblematic of an intent focused originalist. In his essay Raoul Berger and the Restoration of
Originalism, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 253 (2001-2002), Jonathan G. O’Neill explains that Berger “understood ‘original intent’
as ‘shorthand for the meaning attached by the framers to the words they employed in the Constitution and its
amendments.’” Id. at 265. Berger “dissected the debates in the 39th Congress and argued that the Fourteenth Amendment
was intended by its drafters and supporters to constitutionalize only the basic rights contained in the [Civil Rights Act of
1866].” Id. at 264. Berger sought to rebut the liberal view that the amendment was “intended to incorporate the natural
rights theories of antebellum abolitionists, thereby empowering the Court to fashion an open-ended, ‘living Constitution’
from its terms.” Id. at 266.
Alternatively, for a discussion of the contribution of abolitionist constitutionalism to the original public
meaning of Section One, see Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth
Amendment, (Geo. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 10-06, 2011).
80

Jennifer M. McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
561, 573 n.54 (2012) (“The ‘Black Codes’ were passed by each state of the former confederacy and sought to reimpose
many of the legal restrictions that had applied to slaves prior to emancipation, particularly in relation to the exercise of
contractual and civil rights.”).
81
82

Calabresi, supra note 70, at 150.
Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 13.

83

Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947,
958 (1995) (recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment “required an equality in certain specified rights. If a state
provided these rights to its ‘white citizens,’ it had to provide the ‘same right’ to all citizens.”) (emphasis added).
84

Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 19; see also, e.g., Garret Epps, Interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment: Two Don’ts and Three Dos, 16 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 433, 443-44 (2007) (discussing
how the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment employed broad language to provide protection to immigrants, “because
some of them were immigrants themselves,” in addition to Southern Unionists and Northerners moving into the South
after the war).
85

Calabresi, supra note 70, at 150.
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“desire to protect freed slaves.” 86 Though early drafts came closer to merely constitutionalizing
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as revisions were made, specific references to race and color were
removed. 87 While not dispositive evidence of original meaning, key framers, like Jacob Howard,
who explained that the Amendment embraced a ban on feudal caste, 88 or Charles Sumner, who
asserted the same for a Hindu-style caste system in his lecture The Question of Caste, 89 suggest an
original meaning broader than race. Howard stated, the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
was . . . to abolish all class legislation in the States and do away with the injustice of subjecting
one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another.” 90 Moreover, as Calabresi and Rickert
point out,
the Amendment’s Framers and contemporary commentators frequently
compared race discrimination to other forms of arbitrary, caste-creating
discrimination to illustrate the evil caused by the Black Codes and to
explain . . . [a]ny law that discriminates or abridges civil rights to set up a
hereditary caste system violates the command of Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 91
Beyond concerns voiced on the floor of Congress, state governors during ratification
emphasized a need to protect white Unionists in the South after the Civil War—another indication
that the Amendment was understood to go further than protecting just the rights of freed black
men. 92 The press, often a strong indicator of public meaning, also called for something more: one
Chicago Tribune editorial in 1866 made a “forceful appeal for a constitutional amendment . . .
that would level the evil of caste in one blow.” 93 Even those in society who opposed such a broad
86

Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 31.

87

See generally id. at 31-35 (highlighting the discussions of the original framers during the
framing of our constitution.).
88
89

Id. at 33 n.152.
Charles Sumner, in his discussion and rejection of caste, recognizes the need for a broad

prohibition:
Whatever the judgment on the unity of origin, where, from the nature of the case, there can be no
final human testimony, it is a source of infinite consolation, that we can anchor to that their Unity,
found in a common organization, a common nature, and a common destiny, being at once physical,
moral and prophetic. This is the true Unity of the Human Family. In all essentials constituting
Humanity, in all that makes Man, all varieties of the human species are one and the same. There is
no real difference between them. The variance, [w]hether of complexion, configuration or language,
is external and superficial only, like the dress we wear. Here all knowledge and every science
concur.
CHARLES SUMNER, THE QUESTION OF CASTE 17 (1869).
90

Harrison, supra note 70, at 1413 (citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866))
(internal alterations omitted).
91

Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 6.

92

Id. at 36-41. The authors discuss the views of those within the states, citing predominantly
comments from governors at the time of the ratification conventions as to the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
They assert that, “there is little doubt that most understood the Amendment to guarantee equal rights,” and to “be more
than simply a ban on racially discriminatory legislation.” Id. at 40-41.
93

Id. at 29-30 (citing Editorial, Class Legislation, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1866, at 2).
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amendment acknowledged that Congress would go beyond the abolition of slavery in its repeal of
that one type of caste. 94
It may very well be that the Fourteenth Amendment had an original public meaning that
went beyond ameliorating slavery or negating the Black Codes. It protected not only against
“arbitrary and capricious executive and judicial action and from the failure of State executives and
judges to provide the equal protection of those laws already on the books,” but also defended
against systems of caste and class legislation going forward. 95 Though after the fact, Justice
Harlan’s dissent in Plessey v. Ferguson 96 is often cited to support the idea that the Amendment
was to serve as an “anti-caste command.” 97
If we accept that the original meaning of the Amendment is to prohibit caste and class
legislation, then the next step is to define what those terms meant to the public at the time of
ratification. In defining “caste,” dictionaries at the time included both the historic Indian
derivation—namely “a tribe or class of the same profession, as the case of Bramins [sic]”)—as
well as the more broad definition of “a distinct rank or order of society.” 98 The 1857 edition of
Webster’s Dictionary provided both meanings: “[(1)] [a] distinct, hereditary order or class of
people among the Hindoos [sic] the members of which are of the same rank, profession, or
occupation; [(2)] an order or class.” 99 Similarly, an 1856 article in the London Journal and
Weekly Record of Literature, Science, and Art described caste as “a term used to designate the
social distinction and hereditary occupations . . . known to exist among the Egyptians and other
nations of antiquity.” 100 Webster’s defines “class” as “a rank or order of persons or things; a
division; a set of pupils or students of the same form, rank, or degree; a general or primary
division.” 101 Thus, the comparison in public discourse at the time of ratification of “race
discrimination to feudalism and the Indian caste system,” and the determination “that all were the
same type of hereditary, class-based discrimination,” support the notion that hereditariness is a
factor to be considered when ascertaining the existence of a caste system. 102
While “class legislation” does not appear in dictionaries, the term was widely understood
to “encompass laws that grant monopolies or otherwise benefit a favored few.” 103 It may be that,
for all intents and purposes, “class legislation” and “caste” had synonymous meanings during the
ratification period. It is easy to see how the terms could be viewed interchangeably, as both

94

Id. at 30 (citing DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, Jan 5, 1866 col. 1).

95

Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 46, at 21-22; Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 19;
Green, supra note 59, at 601 (“An intermediate ‘no-caste’ principle fits well with Sumner’s invocation of the equality of
the rights of citizens, based on the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
96
97
98
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
99

163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 45.
Id. at 17 n. 72 (citing CHAUCEY A. GOODRICH, A PRONOUNCING AND DEFINING DICTIONARY
64, 75 (1856)).
Id. (citing NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 152

(1857)).
100

F. Phillott, Origin of Cast, LONDON J. & WKLY. REC. LITERATURE, SCI., & ART, Dec. 5,
1857, at 216 (emphasis in original).
101

Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 17 n. 72 (citing NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 152 (1857)).
102
103

Id. at 13.
Id. at 18 n.73.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013

254

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 16

achieve the goal of segmenting the population based on identifiable characteristics that are often
hereditary or definite and relegate a particular group to a “rank or order” lower than that of
another.
Ultimately, there appear to be three features that were characteristically associated with
the idea of a system of caste at the time of ratification. First, a hereditary characteristic is
implicated; second, class legislation and regulation create stratification based on that
characteristic; and third, such stratification leads to the exclusive allocation of rights to one group
at the expense of another. These facets are not definitive, but they provide a useful framework for
the analysis in the next section. As John Harrison explains, the Fourteenth Amendment may also
protect “caste or castes-in-context” where, for example, hereditariness would not be an essential
feature. 104
Section One may alternatively be viewed as a prohibition on class legislation alone.
Professor Melissa Saunders contends that it was originally understood as constitutionalizing a
well-established state court “doctrine against ‘partial’ or ‘special’ laws, which forbade the state to
single out any person or group of persons for special benefits or burdens without adequate ‘public
purpose’ justification.” 105 State courts of the antebellum era found these laws offensive because
they (1) “represented a perversion of the state’s proper role in society . . . as a ‘neutral umpire’
providing equal protection to the rights of all,” and (2) “threatened true republican government
and with it, personal liberty.” 106
Though Saunders focuses on original understanding rather than original public meaning,
she provides substantial evidence from the antebellum and ratification periods that the term “class
legislation” was understood to refer to such partial or special laws. 107 A prohibition on “class
legislation,” so defined, very well may be the original public meaning of Section One. As
previously stated, the work of scholars, legislators, and newspapers of the period can provide
tremendous insight as to the original public meaning of the constitutional text. For example, the
commentary of pre-Civil War scholars like Thomas Cooley and Chancellor William Kent
recognize a widespread aversion to partial or special laws. 108 In his 1868 Treatise on the
Constitutional Limitations, Cooley discusses such unequal and partial legislation. 109 He asserted,
104

Harrison, supra note 70, at 1459. Harrison offers the example that, “[i]f individuals who
drive foreign cars became the subject of widespread resentment, a law forbidding them from purchasing gasoline, that was
motivated by a desire to retaliate against them, would be inconsistent with [the Fourteenth Amendment].” Id. at 1457-58.
Harrison finds that the Fourteenth Amendment is not necessarily limited to systems that segment based on “immutable,
hereditary characteristics,” but also extends to “ad hoc castes.” Id.
105

Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 245, 247-48 (1997). Saunders explains that, “[i]n the first half of the nineteenth century, state courts across America
developed a decided hostility to laws that singled out certain persons or classes of persons for special benefits or burdens.”
Id. at 252; see also, e.g., Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene 15, 27-28 (Iowa 1849); Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326 (1825); Wally’s
Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 554, 556-57 (1831); Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121, 121 (Vt. 1825).
106
107

Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 252-53 n.29.

108

Id. at 259-60; see also WILLIAM KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES KENT 163 (1898)
(“The bill extends this oath to attorneys-at-law, before they can be permitted to practice; but it is not extended to
candidates for the other learned professions, though the same reason would seem to apply, and though the admission of
physicians and surgeons is equally the subject of legislative regulation. The bill, therefore, is not impartial in the
imposition which it creates. If the principle be just, it ought to have a general and equal application.”) (emphasis added).
109

THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
389-97 (3d ed. 1874). Cooley remarks, “[l]aws public
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[e]quality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should be the aim
of the law . . . The State, it is to be presumed, has no favors to bestow, and
designs to inflict no arbitrary deprivation of rights. Special privileges are
obnoxious, and discriminations against persons or classes are still more
so . . . . 110
By the time of the Civil War, a disposition against partial or special laws was embraced
in nearly every state. 111 This concept was the common thread of the compromise between
moderate Republicans and Democrats during the drafting process, who supported the Fourteenth
Amendment “because they saw the measures as logical applications of a broader principle . . . that
government should not use its power to create favored or disfavored classes of citizens, but should
confine itself to the ‘equal protection’ of all.” 112 The general public likewise may have
understood the meaning of Section One to embrace this idea. In 1866, an article in the Cincinnati
Commercial, an influential periodical of the time, remarked that “Section [O]ne was . . . designed
to enforce ‘the great Democratic principle of equality before the law’ and to invalidate all
‘legislation hostile to any class.’” 113
Following my discussion of caste, I will explore how laws denying same-sex marriage
could also violate the Fourteenth Amendment if its original public meaning is alternatively
understood to be a prohibition on partial or special class legislation.

in their objects may be general or local in their application; they may embrace many subjects or one, and they may extend
to all the citizens or be confined to particular classes . . . .” Id. at 390. When applying to a particular class, the laws must
be “general in their application to the class.” Id. These are “general laws in the constitutional sense.” Id. However,
“every one [sic] has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules, and a special statute that singles his case out
as one to be regulated by a different law from that which is applied in all similar cases would not be legitimate legislation,
but an arbitrary mandate, unrecognized in free government.” Id. at 391-92.
110

Id. at 393. Interestingly, Cooley’s ideas bear a close relationship to present-day Supreme
Court Equal Protection jurisprudence, which was “built upon . . . cornerstones” laid by Cooley, Justice Stephen Fields, and
Justice Joseph Bradley. Saunders, supra note 105, at 301. In fact, in the first edition of Cooley’s treatise published after
ratification, he wrote, “the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted . . . [to settle that] the same securities which one citizen
may demand, all others are entitled to.” Id. at 294 (citing COOLEY, supra note 109, at 397).
111
112

Saunders, supra note 105, at 258.
Id. at 268. Saunders explains,

the clause represented a carefully forged compromise between the abolitionists in the Republican
Party’s radical wing, who would have liked to prevent the states from ever taking race into
consideration in governing, and the former Democrats in its moderate wing, who were not prepared
to concede that race should be completely excised from governmental decisionmaking but were
firmly committed to the idea that the states should not be allowed to single out certain groups for
special benefits or burdens without adequate justification.
Id. at 292. For a wide array of evidence from the Congressional Record during the drafting period to support that a
prohibition of “class legislation” was the understood meaning of Section One, see generally id. at 268-93.
113

Id. at 288. The Commercial stated,

With this section engrafted upon the Constitution it will be impossible for any Legislature to enact
special codes for one class of its citizens, as several of the reconstructed States have done,
subjecting them to penalties from which citizens of another class are excepted if convicted of the
same grade of offense, or confer privileges upon one class that it denies to another.
Id. (emphasis added).
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III. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AS A PROHIBITION OF CASTE BASED ON
SEXUAL ORIENTATION
A. Method of Analysis and Application of the Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to
Sexual Orientation
If the arguments surveyed in Part II above reflect the view that the Fourteenth
Amendment establishes a principle prohibiting systems of caste and class legislation, then by
engaging in construction and applying that principle to a modern understanding of the facts about
sexual orientation, a modern interpreter could find that laws stratifying based on that feature
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. I now seek to demonstrate how, as a matter of history and
science, those individuals sexually oriented toward persons of the same gender—focusing
predominantly on gay men—could be determined to have been living under just such a system. A
system of caste based on same-sex attraction exists if (1) sexual orientation is at least in part
hereditary; (2) there is a history of stratification based on sexual orientation; and (3) there is an
exclusive allocation of rights to heterosexual persons to the exclusion of gay men and lesbian,
therein perpetuating a second-class status.
Briefly, it is important to understand that the gay community is not a small part of the
American population. Though the oft-cited statistic from 1948 Kinsey Reports suggests that one
in ten individuals are gay, 114 this has long been rejected by recent data, and genetic researcher
Simon LeVay indicates that about 3.1% of men and 0.9% of women reported having a same-sex
orientation—a statistically significant minority. 115 These statistics were recently affirmed by a
poll released on October 18, 2012, by Gallup and the Williams Institute, reporting that 3.4% of all
Americans identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. 116
B. Same-Sex Attraction as a Hereditary Feature 117
As indicated above, the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment was understood

114

Homosexuality,
KINSEY
data.html#homosexuality (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).

INST.,

http://kinseyinstitute.org/research/ak-

115

SIMON LEVAY, GAY, STRAIGHT, AND THE REASONS WHY: THE SCIENCE OF SEXUAL
ORIENTATION 14 (2011). At least one other recent study has found these percentages to be greater. CTR. FOR SEXUAL
HEALTH PROMOTION, IND. UNIV. BLOOMINGTON, NATIONAL SURVEY OF SEXUAL HEALTH AND BEHAVIOR, http://
nationalsexstudy.indiana.edu/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2013) (“[A]bout 7% of adult women and 8% of men identify as gay,
lesbian or bisexual . . . .”).
116

Gary J. Gates & Frank Newport, Special Report: 3.4% of U.S. Adults Identify as LGBT,
GALLUP, Oct. 18, 2012, http://gallup.com/poll/158066/special-report-adults-identify-lgbt.aspx. This survey of 120,000
Americans is the largest single study of the distribution of LGBT population in the United States on record.
117

I explore scientific findings regarding the possible innate or hereditary nature of same-sex
attraction en route to my broader explanation of how an originalist could find that laws prohibiting same-sex marriage
violate the constitution. Determinations will have to be made about which of these points are relevant and which will be
accepted as legislative fact. See generally John Monahan & Laurens Walker, A Judges’ Guide to Using Social Science, 43
CT. REV. 156 (2007) (discussing how judges determine legislative facts in litigation); Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach
to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942) (discussing how and whether rules
of evidence apply in administrative adjudications). This also raises the further question of whether these determinations
are properly made in the courthouse or in the legislature.
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in part to prohibit caste and class legislation derived from hereditary characteristics. 118 Webster’s
1861 Dictionary defines “hereditary” as a characteristic “that is or may be transmitted from a
parent to a child; as, hereditary pride; hereditary bravery; hereditary disease.” 119 Webster’s also
defines “inherit” as “[t]o receive by nature from progenitor. The son inherits the virtues of his
father; the daughter inherits the temper of her mother, and children often inherit the constitutional
infirmities of their parents.” 120 It appears that at the time of ratification, for a trait or tendency to
be inherited or “hereditary” meant that it was innate. Traits that we know today not to be
inherited in a genetic sense were modified in common parlance using the adjective “hereditary,”
such as being patriotic, 121 cultured, 122 and even being prone toward extreme accidents. 123 Other
traits like insanity, criminality, morality, and even genius were believed to be hereditary. 124 Thus,
it was believed that tendencies or orientations were as hereditary as parental “virtues” like a
“strong constitution.” 125 If the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited caste systems segmenting
society based on hereditary characteristics—which could be outwardly signaled by skin color, or
be as arbitrary and as unapparent as the Indian Caste system, which employed names and
certificates as identifiers—it is logical to conclude that it would have been as indefensible to

118

See McConnell, supra note 83, at 1011 n.303 (1995) (“defin[ing] the term ‘caste’ as ‘any
separate and fixed order of society,’ where one group ‘claims hereditary rank and privilege,’ while another is ‘doomed to
hereditary degradation and disability.’”) (citing Senator Charles Sumner, On the Question of Caste, in 13 WORKS OF
CHARLES SUMNER 133, 143 (1880)).
119

NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 548 (Chaucey A.
Goodrich ed., 1861), available at http://openlibrary.org/books/OL25326244M/An_American_dictionary_of_the_English_
language. This definition was consistent throughout the 1800s. See ARTFL PROJECT: WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY, 1828 ED., http://machaut.uchicago.edu/?resource=Webster%27s (unclick “Use 1913 Edition”; then search
“hereditary”) (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
120

WEBSTER, supra note 119, at 605. It is also worth noting that Webster’s defined
“inheritable” in 1861 as that which “may be transmitted from the parent to the child; as, inheritable qualities or
infirmities.”
Id.
See also ARTFL PROJECT: WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, 1828 ED.,
http://machaut.uchicago.edu/?resource=Webster%27s (unclick “Use 1913 Edition”; then search “inherit”) (last visited
Mar. 31, 2013).
121

C.W.F., Letter to the Editor, Hereditary Patriotism, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1861, at 3.

122

President Eliot, High Education is Hereditary, CHRISTIAN RECORDER, Feb. 24, 1876 (stating
that “[c]ulture is much surer to descend to children than wealth, because the nature forces of hereditary transmission are on
its side.”).
123

Hereditary Accidents, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1873, at 6.

124

See, e.g., A Mad Family, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1871, at 4 (“Hereditary insanity excites no
surprise, although . . . hereditary genius may.”); Aug. Woodbury, Crime and its Causes: An Analysis of its Several Causes
With Suggestions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1874, at 3 (classifying one type of criminal as those who have “a transmitted or
inherited defect of character or evil trait”); FRANCIS GALTON, HEREDITARY GENIUS: AN INQUIRY INTO LAWS AND
CONSEQUENCES, at v (1869) (explaining how he set out to “examin[e] . . . the kindred of about four hundred illustrious
men of all periods of history . . . to establish the theory that genius was hereditary”); John Crockford, Mind and Matter,
illustrated by Considerations on Hereditary Insanity and the Influence of Temperament in the Development of the
Passions, CRITIC, June 12, 1847, at 474 (“Moral qualities are likewise transmitted such as thieving, lying, and even worse
crimes.”).
125

See WEBSTER, supra note 120, at 695; see also, ARTFL PROJECT: WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY, 1913 ED., http://machaut.uchicago.edu/?resource=Webster%27s (unclick “Use 1828 Edition”; then search
“inherit”) (last visited May. 8, 2013) (defining inherit, in part, as “to receive or take by birth; to have by nature; to derive
or acquire from ancestors, as mental or physical qualities; as, he inherits a strong constitution, a tendency to disease, etc.).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013

258

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 16

create a system that segmented the population based on an innate orientation, for example those
who were predisposed toward being more or less patriotic. Extending that idea, if sexual
orientation is physically inherited in the biological sense and is also perceived as an innate
inclination, then stratifying based on that characteristic would contravene the Amendment’s
original public meaning.
While there is no definitive scientific consensus as to why an individual develops a
particular sexual orientation, and it may be a combination of “nature and nurture . . . play[ing]
complex roles; [the consensus appears to be that] most people experience little or no sense of
choice about their sexual orientation.” 126 Psychobiological research on genetics and prenatal
hormones indicate that sexual orientation is at least in part hereditary or innate. 127 This research
supports the assertion that being gay is likely not a “fickle choice subject to correction,” 128 but a
feature biologically rooted in a particular individual. This part seeks to support the assertion that
same-sex attraction is, at least in part, a hereditary characteristic.
1. Genetics
Do genes influence sexual orientation and other aspects of gender? 129 A sizeable portion
of genetic research on sexual orientation has focused on the search for a “gay gene.” 130 While it

126

AM.
PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASS’N,
Sexual
Orientation
and
Homosexuality,
http://apa.org/helpcenter/sexual-orientation.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2013); see also LEVAY, supra note 115, at 41 (“In the
mid 1990s, researchers at the RAND Institute analyzed the response of gay men and lesbians to a questionnaire in The
Advocate . . . [which found] 90% of the gay men and 50% of the lesbians [surveyed] said that they felt they were ‘born
gay.’”) (citing J. Lever, Sexual Revelations: The 1994 Advocate Survey of Sexuality and Relationships: The Men, THE
ADVOCATE 17-24 (August 23, 1994) and J. Lever, Lesbian Sex Survey, THE ADVOCATE 21-30 (August 22 1995)).
127

See GLENN WILSON & QAZI RAHMAN, BORN GAY: THE PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF SEX
ORIENTATION 9 (2005) (“Throughout history there have been many conflicting theories [about why an individual has a
same-sex preference], including ‘perverse choice’,[sic] seduction by older gays, being raised by smothering mothers and
absent or aloof fathers, chance conditioning, traumatic early heterosexual experiences . . . .”). The common theme among
these explanations is that same-sex attraction is not something natural and innate, but rather the product of degeneration,
often presumed psychological, of humanity. Id. at 30-31. These beliefs are in part the byproduct of flawed, and largely
rejected, Freudian psychoanalytics that attributed the roots of same-sex attraction to an individual’s failure to properly
proceed through Freud’s stages of human psychological development. Id. One Freudian theory found that a sexual
“inversion” occurs when a boy is unable to detach from the maternal obsession, turned instead toward those “who
represent himself” as sexual partners. Id. Other psychological and psychoanalytical theories proposed regression (or
failure to outgrow) the anal phase or toddler-age “homosexual phase,” a repressed early emotional trauma, and even a fear
of the female genitalia as the embodiment of fear of castration. Id. As to lesbianism, psychoanalytical theory proposed as
its root the notion of “penis envy” and an impulse to rebel against the female role in favor of a masculine role. Id. at 32.
128
129

Id. at 9.
LEVAY, supra note 115, at 43.

130

The search for a “gay gene” is a charged issue within the LGBT community. Critics within
the community express concern with the idea that “greater acceptance and fair treatment” of LGBT persons is predicated
on whether sexual orientation is biologically “hardwired.” Joe Sartelle, Rejecting the Gay Brain (and choosing
homosexuality), BAD SUBJECTS, May 1994, http://bad.eserver.org/issues/1994/14/sartelle.html. Critics further contend,
the problem with the “no choice” position on homosexuality is that in order to be effective. . . [one
must] forget about the important distinction between desire and behavior. . . . [For] even if research
conclusively proves that homosexual feelings are biological in origin and thus not something an
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is unlikely that such a singular gene exists, research nonetheless suggests there is a genetic root
for sexual orientation.
The first major support for a genetic basis of sexual orientation emerged from research
finding a higher incidence of male same-sex attraction within families. These studies also
suggested a maternal genetic linkage. The most well-known study was performed by Dean
Hamer in 1993, who found that 13.5% of gay men had a gay brother, 7% had a gay uncle, and
another 7% had one or more gay cousins. 131 Gay uncles and cousins were found to be
predominantly on the maternal side. 132 Hamer concluded that the “the site for the ‘gay genes’
might be on the X chromosome.” 133 A subsequent study in 1998 of 182 families with two or
more gay brothers also found [indicators of] maternal transmission. 134 Later tests have called into
question the X chromosome hypothesis, and it appears more likely that a gene or a group of genes
on the X chromosome contributes to sexual orientation but is not the sole determining factor. 135
Though suggestive of a genetic link, results have been too inconsistent to determine with certainty
that the link is maternal.
Twin studies have been another important source of genetic research. Analyzing twins is
an ideal way to “separate the effects of genes from the effects of the environment.” 136 Such
research entails comparing identical, monozygotic, twins that develop from a single egg and
fraternal, dizygotic, twins, which develop from separate eggs. 137 The functionality of this
comparison arises from the fact that monozygotic twins share 100% of their genetic make-up,
whereas fraternal twins share only 50% (the same as ordinary siblings). 138 Both sets of twins are

individual has any control over, this does not necessarily carry with it the right to act upon those
feelings.
Id.
131
132
133
134

WILSON & RAHMAN, supra note 127, at 50.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 50-51.

135

Id. at 51. In further research of the X-chromosome theory, Dean Hamer “conducted an
analysis of the DNA of a selected group of 40 pairs of gay brothers and examined 22 DNA markers on the X
chromosome.” Id. at 52. He found that 82% of the gay brothers shared a region of the X chromosome referred to as
Xq28. Id. Testing those results against 32 new pairs of gay brothers, 36 pairs of lesbian sisters, and the heterosexual
brothers of the initial gay pairs revealed that 67% of gay brothers shared Xq28, where none of the lesbian sisters did. Id.
The heterosexual brothers had a 22% chance of carrying the Xq28 marker. Id. Hamer concluded that the genes in Xq28
may influence sexual orientation of men, but not women. Id. In the 1998 study, the Xq28 marker was shared by 66% of
the gay brothers. Id. A subsequent study by researchers at the University of Western Ontario failed to replicate those
findings. Id. See also Ingrid Wickelgren, Discovery of ‘Gay Gene’ Questioned, 284 SCIENCE 571, Apr. 23, 1999,
http://sciencemag.org/content/ 284/5414/571.summary; Doubt cast on ‘gay gene’, BBC NEWS, Apr. 23, 1999,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/ 325979.stm.
136
137

WILSON & RAHMAN, supra note 127, at 45.
Id.

138

Id. One criticism of twin studies is that they “include small sample sizes and assumptions
that identical and fraternal twins both have the same family environments; if identical twins are treated more similarly by
their parents than fraternal twins, for example, this could be mistaken for a genetic influence.” Michael Balter, Gay Is Not
All in the Genes, SCIENCENOW, June 30, 2008, http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2008/06/30-01.html. Furthermore,
given that the actual proportion of the population identifying as gay is so small, it is difficult to find a large enough sample
size of twins that could yield conclusive results about this population. WILSON & RAHMAN, supra note 127, at 48.
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often raised in similar environments. A higher level of concordance in a trait in monozygotic
relative to dizygotic twins can be an indication of a “greater role for genetics in that trait, because
the genetic contribution between these two sets of twins differs markedly while their environment
is held constant.” 139 Statistically speaking, it is estimated that personality trait variations are 50%
genetic, and 50% environmental. 140 “One landmark study in 1991 looked at gay men’s brothers
and found that 52% of identical twin brothers were also gay, in contrast with only 22% of nonidentical twin brothers and 11% of adoptive, genetically unrelated brothers.” 141 Accounting for
volunteer bias, a subsequent twin study found the actual hereditability of same-sex attraction to be
closer to 31% for men and about 50% for women. 142 One study conducted in 2000 found “nonheterosexual orientation” among identical twins to be 30%, relative to 8% for fraternal twins. 143
Notably, “identical twins concordant for sexual orientation [did not] report greater similarity in
their childhood experiences than identical twins that were non-concordant. In fact . . . male
concordant identical pairs reported having less similar childhoods.” 144 As doctors Glen Wilson
and Qazi Rahman assert in their book, Born Gay, while “genetic factors are [clearly] involved in
the origins of sexual orientation,” environmental factors likely play an important role as well.145
Other possible genetic sources for sexual orientation have also been suggested. One
highly controversial study reinforced the likelihood of a genetic connection on the basis of what
has been dubbed the “fertile female hypothesis.” 146 The study submits that gay men are often
found in larger families because such families carry a gene that promotes a heightened sexual
attraction to males inciting “greater fecundity of female relatives.” 147 Another speculative study
suggests that mitochondrial DNA acts “selfishly” in favor of a female species by targeting the
fetus’s sexual orientation. 148 Despite the breadth of theories, geneticists ultimately recognize that
it is unlikely a single switch determines or controls sexual orientation. What is more likely is that
sexual orientation is determined by a polygenic collection. 149 Nevertheless, genetics appear to

139
140

WILSON & RAHMAN, supra note 127, at 45.
Id. at 45-46.

141

Frank Bruni, Genetic or Not, Gay Won’t Go Away, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2012,
http://nytimes.com/2012/ 01/29/opinion/sunday/bruni-gay-wont-go-away-genetic-or-not.html.
142

See K.M. Kirk et. al., Measurement Models for Sexual Orientation in a Community Twin
Sample, 30 BEHAVIOR GENETICS 345, 355 (2000).
143
144
145
146

WILSON & RAHMAN, supra note 127, at 49.
Id.
Id.
LEVAY, supra note 115, at 185.

147

Id. at 185-86 (discussing Andrea Camperio-Ciani, et al., Evidence For Maternally Inherited
Factors Favouring Male Homosexuality And Promoting Female Fecundity, 271 (1554) PROCEEDINGS: BIOLOGICAL
SCIENCES 2217-21 (Nov. 7, 2004)); see also Michael Balter, “Gay Genes” May Be Good for Women, June 18, 2008,
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/ 2008/06/18-01.html (discussing research finding that same-sex attraction survives
in the population because genes influencing sexual orientation “may increase fertility in women.”).
148

LEVAY, supra note 115, at 172; see also Daniel Honan, The Gay Gene: New Evidence
Supports an Old Hypothesis, BIG THINK, June 16, 2012, http://bigthink.com/think-tank/the-gay-gene-new-evidencesupports-an-old-hypothesis (quoting Bryan Sykes, the author of the 2011 book DNA USA, who asserts that male same-sex
attraction may be “explain[ed] by the way that mitochondria are inherited down the female line . . . getting rid of male
embryos and making sure that they’re propagated at the expense of males.”).
149

WILSON & RAHMAN, supra note 127, at 53; see also, Howy Jacobs, Don’t ask, don’t tell,
don’t publish, EMBO REPORTS, May 1, 2012, http://nature.com/embor/journal/v13/n5/full/embor201248a.html
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have a heavy hand in an individual’s sexual orientation, even if the role and scope of its influence
have not yet been completely defined. 150
2. Hormones and Brain Structure
More recently, research has focused on the role of prenatal hormones in defining sexual
orientation. A fetus, though genetically of a particular gender, does not fully develop
distinguishing genitalia until the third trimester. 151 During that period, the “Y chromosome . . .
kicks off the cascade of hormonal events that produces a recognizable male.” 152 A key role in this
process is played by the Androgen Receptor protein, which directs the actions of sex hormones
and allows testosterone to enter into and bind to cells. 153 This hormonal process has a large
impact on the way the brain and body develop. 154
The “prenatal androgen theory,” or prenatal hormone theory, is based on the idea that
sexual orientation is determined by a decreased level of prenatal testosterone in gay men (or an
increased level of prenatal testosterone in lesbian women), precipitating under-masculinization (or
over-masculinization). 155 Whether caused by testosterone or a lack thereof, due to an absence of
sufficient “aromatase to convert testosterone to estrogen within the male brain,” prenatal
hormones appear to impact the brain and behavior. 156 This occurs through (1) “organizational
effects, which mold brain and behaviour early in the womb and are irreversible,” and (2)
“activational [sic] effects, which are transient effects of hormones circulating in the blood upon
brain and behavior in adulthood.” 157 Activational effects, in contrast with organizational effects,
“‘turn on’ functional systems whose basic structure has developed much earlier in life . . . and are
generally not permanent.” 158
Data indicates that “the levels of sex hormones circulating during fetal life direct the
development of the brain and influence gendered traits,” including sexual orientation. 159 While
some gendered characteristics result from human environmental factors, others are innate to males
and females across the animal kingdom, particularly among mammals. To support this
contention, genetics researcher Simon LeVay offers three primary observations:

(comparing the polygenic nature of prostate cancer and the likely polygenic nature of same-sex attraction, as well as the
paucity of research on the genetics of same-sex orientation); LEVAY, supra note 115, at 173.
150

Balter, supra note 147 (“Studies suggest that homosexuality is at least partly genetic. And
although homosexuals have far fewer children than heterosexuals, so-called gay genes apparently survive in the
population.”); see also Simon LeVay, The Paradox of Gay Genes, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 1, 2012,
http://huffingtonpost.com/simon-levay/the-paradox-of-gay-genes_b_1929641.html (“The key to understanding how gay
genes survive is the realization that such genes exist, not only in gay people themselves, but also in some of their non-gay
relatives.”).
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159

WILSON & RAHMAN, supra note 127, at 69.
Id.
Id. at 69-70
Id. at 70.
Id.
Id. at 71 (explaining the aromatization hypothesis).
Id.
LEVAY, supra note 115, at 54.
Id. at 43.
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First, . . . experiments conducted using nonhuman animals . . . indicate that
testosterone levels during a “critical period” before and around the time of birth
influence an animal’s preference for male or female sex partners after
puberty . . . [A] similar developmental mechanism might operate in ourselves
as in other animals. The critical period . . . in humans would probably be
entirely before birth, given that humans are born at a much later stage of brain
maturation than most laboratory animals. Second, . . . gendered traits . . . are
indeed influenced by prenatal hormones. . . . Third, the fact that homosexuality
is linked to a variety of gendered-atypical traits in childhood and adulthood . . .
suggests . . . a “gender package” that has common developmental roots. 160
LeVay’s research also identifies physical manifestations of the hormonal influence on
brain structure and gendered traits. He has extensively studied the hypothalamus and identified a
sexually dimorphic (“differing in structure between male and females”) cell group named INAH3. 161 The grouping is found to be “two to three times larger in men than women.” 162 In an
autopsy study where the deceased’s sexual orientation was known, it was found that INAH-3 was
smaller for gay men than straight men, comparable in size to that of straight women. 163 However,
at least one subsequent study of 34 straight men, 34 straight women, and 14 gay men called into
question the statistical validity of LeVay’s results. 164
Yet LeVay also found a similar correlation between same-sex orientated conduct and a
parallel cell grouping in other mammals called the sexually dimorphic nucleus of the preoptic
area, or SDN-POA. Lowering or blocking testosterone during critical periods of development in
laboratory mammals caused that cell grouping to shrink. These male animals also exhibited
atypical sexual conduct—males became less likely to mount partners and acquiesced to being
mounted. LeVay contends that testosterone’s organizational and activational effects precipitated
the change in the size of SDN-POA and directed the animal’s shift in sexual orientation. 165
Other studies found a correlation between sexual orientation and differences in brain

160
161
162

Id. at 132.
Id. at 47.
Id.

163

Simon LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and
Homosexual Men, 253 (5023) SCIENCE 1034-35 (Aug. 30, 1991); see also Simon LeVay, The “Gay Brain” Revisited,
NERVE, Sept. 5, 2000, http://nerve.com/love-sex/the-science-of-sex-the-gay-brain-revisited.
164

William Byne et al., The Interstitial Nuclei of the Human Anterior Hypothalamus: An
Investigation of Variation with Sex, Sexual Orientation, and HIV Status, 40(2) HORMONES AND BEHAVIOR 86-92 (2001)
(finding the size difference in INAH3 between gay and straight males less statistically significant). Though the Byne et al.
study confirmed that INAH-3 was larger in straight men than in straight women, the trend towards a smaller INAH-3
grouping in gay men was found not to be statistically reliable. WILSON & RAHMAN, supra note 127, at 112.
165

LeVay, supra note 115, at 47-55. Prenatal exposure to higher levels of testosterone in
female guinea pigs leads them to “mount” other animals in adulthood, rather than “display lordosis” (acquiescence to
being mounted). Id. at 55. Conversely, males deprived of testosterone were “less likely to mount other animals and more
likely to display lordosis.” Id. In addition, “[s]exual dimorphisms in similar nuclei have been found in other mammals [in
addition to rats] such as guinea pigs, ferrets, sheep and some primates. The main cause of this sex difference appears to be
the differing exposure of males and females to testosterone in the womb.” WILSON & RAHMAN, supra note 127, at 109.
Wilson and Rahman also discuss research by Roger Groski at UCLA in 1978 that demonstrated that differing androgen
levels affected the size of the SDN-POA. Id.
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structure and cognitive function. One recent study concluded that, “the size of the two
symmetrical halves of the brains of gay men more closely resembled those of straight women than
they did straight men.” 166 Cognitive studies have also found indications of a “gender shift”
among gay men and gay women regarding “male-favoring visuospatial traits such as mental
rotation, targeting, and navigation, as well as female-favoring tasks such as verbal
fluency . . . .” 167 Ultimately, biology appears to contribute to sexual orientation, even if the
“correlation between form and function” remains unclear. 168
3. Summarizing the Scientific Research on the Hereditary Nature of Sexual Orientation
It appears that sexual orientation likely results from a combination of factors—genetic,
hormonal, and environmental. Because sexual orientation is likely “inherited,” either genetically
or on the basis of prenatal hormones (whose function may also be determined by our genetic
code), that fact is likely sufficient to identify this characteristic as “hereditary” as it would be
understood at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification (an inherited, innate behavioral
characteristic). That sexual orientation is, at least in part, the product of biology serves to
strengthen its hereditary quality.
C. A History of Laws and Regulations Stratifying Society on Sexual Orientation and its Related
Conduct
If male same-sex attraction is in fact hereditary, for the Fourteenth Amendment to be
implicated, there must additionally be a system of caste or class legislation that stratifies society
based on that feature. In this section, I will show that there exist long-standing legal and
administrative practices that relegate gay men to second-class status: first, the indirect prohibition
of conduct today commonly associated with male same-sex orientation; and second, upon the
coalescence of an identifiable gay community during the 1920s, the direct efforts of legislatures,
courts, and bureaucratic agencies to criminalize male same-sex attraction, suppress same-sex
association, and stifle the development of a gay sub-culture.
1. The Criminality of Same-Sex Conduct from the Colonial Period to World War I
Early laws did not “define individuals as homosexuals per se,” 169 nor would individuals
have understood themselves to be “homosexual” prior to the rise of psychoanalytics in the 1880s.
Rather, laws criminalized conduct such as sodomy and oral sex, generally without mentioning
particular participants’ sexual orientation. 170 In essence, American sodomy laws sought to
166

Alice Park, What the Gay Brain Looks Like, TIME, June 17, 2008,
http://time.com/time/health/article/ 0,8599,1815538,00.html; see also, LEVAY, supra note 115, at 274 (noting gay men are
gender-shifted in their brain chemistry and composition).
167
168
169

LEVAY, supra note 115, at 274.
Id. at 217.
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 18, at 19.

170

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 566, 568 (2003). In England the “first civil English sodomy
law was enacted in 1533, prohibiting the ‘detestable and abominable Vice of Buggery committed with mankind or beast’
and imposing punishment by death and forfeiture of all property belonging to [the offender].” MOGUL ET AL., supra note
18, at 12-13. During this period, cross-dressing and sexual interactions between women were severely punished
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prohibit non-procreative sexual activity. 171 Thus, the country has “no longstanding history. . . of
laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter.” 172 Nevertheless, in this first part I will
show how criminal prohibitions of the sort of intimate conduct currently associated with male
same-sex conduct produced an environment inclined toward the sort of direct legislation that
developed near the turn of the twentieth century.
The criminalization of conduct today associated with same-sex orientation extends as far
back as the early colonial North America. 173 Spanish and Portuguese colonizers enforced
sexuality and gender hierarchies on indigenous populations; they corporally punished native
males who engaged in sexual relations with other men and reviled at the sight of “[i]ndigenous
‘men’ who [took] on the appearance, mannerisms, duties, and roles of ‘women . . . .’” 174 On the
other side of the continent, the British imported laws to the thirteen colonies prohibiting sodomy
and punishing deviation from western gender norms. Though often difficult to enforce (it was
rare for authorities to catch consenting adults in the act), 175 statutes that prohibited sodomy,
buggery, and “crimes-against-nature” nonetheless threatened individuals engaging in this conduct
with death, as such acts were labeled capital crimes “on par with murder, treason, and
adultery.” 176 From American independence until the late 1800s, the text and application of these
laws changed little from the colonial versions. 177
After the Civil War, middle-class urban society became concerned with people who
departed from increasingly rigid gender and sexuality roles. 178 Broadly crafted “morals codes”
criminalized conducting oneself in a manner outside of expected gendered behavior. 179 By 1890,
the emergence of psychoanalytics, and its designation of such behaviors as psychologically
degenerate, spawned a societal anxiety about the “sexual inversion” of women who dressed as
men, and men “who renounced the male gender role as they renounced the male sex role . . . .”180

throughout Europe—part of a civilization-wide emphasis on enforcing gender roles. The terms buggery and sodomy
“were sometimes . . . used interchangeably . . . [as] both terms proscribed non-procreative sexual acts . . . .” Id. at 13.
Note, however, that sexual interactions with an animal were prosecuted as buggery.” Id.
171
172

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568.
Id.

173

See generally MOGUL ET AL., supra note 18, at 2-5 (arguing that Europeans created gender
hierarchies through sexually violent enforcement during the colonization period).
174

Id. at 3. Biblically derived prohibitions on “the Sodomitic vice” emerged in Western Europe
in the 1400s, around the period of the Spanish Inquisition. Id. at 2-4, 12. Spanish and Portuguese missionaries in the New
World identified what they recognized as “intrinsic sexual deviance” as “reminiscent of the biblical tale of Sodom and
Gomorrah.” Id. at 2-3. They took significant steps to suppress cross-gendered dress and impose Western-style
masculinity. Id. at 2-4. Mogul, Ritchie, and Witlock contend that “suppression of gender fluidity” and imposition of
“patriarchy” was a large part of the “formation of the U.S. nation state on Indigenous land.” Id. at 3.
175

WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 19

(1999).
176

MOGUL ET AL., supra note 18, at 13.

177

ESKRIDGE, supra note 175, at 19 (noting that in 1880 only sixty-three persons were
incarcerated for “crimes against nature” and pre-1881 prosecutions “overwhelmingly focused on male-female, adult-child,
or man-animal relations rather than same-sex intimacy”).
178
179

Id. at 20.
Id. at 19 (identifying penal codes of New York and Chicago as being typical of moral codes

of the mid to late 1800s).
180

Id. at 20.
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Rapidly, “[c]ategories of a disapproved people—the “sodomite, the sexual invert, the
homosexual”—entered public discourse. 181
The turn of the twentieth century marked two key shifts: first, these “disapproved
people” began to develop their own subcultures and meeting places in American cities; and
second, the clinical and medical classification of sexual inversion as sexual psychopathy 182 led
“inversion” to become associated with rape and child molestation. 183 The coalescence of
“inverts,” and the identification of that group as morally degenerate, triggered the first legal
reactions to gay culture. Groups like New York’s Comstock Society emerged to “suppress vice”
and pressure police into enforcing moral and sodomy laws through raids of clubs and other
venues frequented by the so-called “inverts.” 184
Between 1880 and 1921, sodomy laws expanded to include oral sex and used
increasingly specific and clinical language to define prohibited conduct. States and municipalities
also expanded public indecency prohibitions targeting gender fraud, gender deviance, and sexual
deviance—these laws provided grounds for the entrapment and harassment of “gender-benders”
and gay men. 185 In New York, for example, “the legislature added a new section 887(9) to the
Criminal Procedure Code, expanding the definition of illegal ‘vagrant’ to include ‘every male
person who . . . solicits for immoral purposes [in any public place].’” 186 The state employed this
statute as a legal basis for police action against male “inverts”, especially in raids of clubs. 187 The
conviction rate for these crimes was a staggering 83%. 188 During this time the federal
government—also prompted by prevailing medical assumptions—empowered the Immigration
Naturalization Service to deport or exclude “sexual perverts” and others who “because of . . .
abnormal impulses are in repeated conflict with social customs and constituted authorities;” the
War Department similarly instituted regulations to “discharge” existing and “screen out” potential
“sodomites” and “inverts” from its ranks. 189
2. The Rise of Class Legislation and Regulation Directed Specifically at Gay Males and the
Suppression of Gay Society from WWI to the 1960s
The twenties ushered in a period in which “sexual acts and desires became constitutive
of identity.” 190 Yet, the sexual liberation for heterosexuals during this time also had the impact of
marking same-sex attraction and gay men and lesbian women with the new taboo. 191 From the
1920s onward, state and federal regulations, often claiming national security concerns, targeted
gays and lesbians and sought to root them out of public employment and to suppress gay
community development. On the criminal front, a mushrooming national hysteria over child
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

Id. at 18.
Id. at 22-24.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 24-37.
Id. at 29
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 36-37.
MOGUL ET AL., supra note 18, at 19.
ESKRIDGE, supra note 175, at 40.
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molestation and the perceived threat of gay men to America’s youth spurred harsher legal
penalties for intimate actions between individuals of the same gender. These laws imposed a
stigma of deviance, criminality, and otherness on gay men and lesbian women.
a. Regulatory Actions
As Professor William Eskridge put it bluntly, “[t]he modern regulatory state cut its teeth
on gay people.” 192 The first regulations targeting gay men were spurred by the mobilization of
American forces in World War I and were born out of a growing concern over same-sex intimacy
among soldiers. 193 The rise of the bureaucratic state produced an environment that excluded gay
men from the workplace and sought to foil public association of a growing gay community.
With Herbert Hoover’s FBI leading the charge, the federal government made it a priority
to root out “homosexual and other sex perverts” for fear that “[t]he social stigma attached to sex
perversion . . . [may make them] go to great lengths to conceal their perverted tendencies.” 194 In
essence, Hoover feared gay men within the government were at risk for communist blackmail and
coercion. Existing regulations were employed to serve that end, as “the Civil Service
Commissions regulation barring from federal employment people who engage in ‘immoral
conduct’ was read to include ‘homosexuality.’” 195 “[A]ntihomosexual witch-hunt[s]” at the
federal level soon gave way to the same at the state level. 196 For example, the California State
Bar disbarred lawyers for same-sex acts between consenting adults. 197 In Florida, legislative
investigation committees engaged in a six-year campaign to purge state schools of gay staff and
teachers. 198 That effort was fueled by concerns that gay men, incapable of procreation, needed to
recruit new boys to preserve their numbers. 199
In addition to being rooted out of the workplace, gay social culture and community
association also came under pressure. In a growing number of cities, from New York and Los
Angeles to Pittsburgh and Providence, “police . . . observed gay hangouts, posed as decoys to
attract solicitations, and raided gay bars, baths and other spaces.” 200 After WWII the efforts of
vice squads to “purge” gay men from their cities became even more overt and directed. 201 The

192
193

Id. at 43.
Id. at 37.

194

Id. at 68; see generally Douglas M. Charles, From Subversion to Obscenity: The FBI’s
Investigations of the Early Homophile Movement in the United States, 1953-1958, 19(2) J. OF THE HIST. OF SEXUALITY
262, 285 (May 2010) (highlighting the FBI’s investigations into the beginnings of gay rights groups).
195

Exec. Order No. 10,450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2491 (Apr. 29, 1953); ESKRIDGE, supra note 175, at
69 (identifying that in 1951 the U.S. State Department fired 119 employees for “homosexuality” and another 134 in 1952).
196
197
198

ESKRIDGE, supra note 175, at 72.
Id. at 73.
Id.

199

See Evelyn Schlatter & Robert Steinback, 10 Anti-Gay Myths Debunked, INTELLIGENCE
REP., no. 140, Winter 2010, http://splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2010/winter/10-myths.
200

ESKRIDGE, supra note 175, at 44.

201

Id. at 63-64. Eskridge provides some striking arrest statistics from America’s major cities
during this period: “sodomy or solicitation of sodomy generated almost sixty percent of the arrests by Philadelphia’s
morals squad in 1949;” that amounts to two hundred men brought to court each month. Id. at 63. After WWII, the Los
Angeles police department’s moral division arrested thousands of gay men annually, and Washington, D.C., armed with
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means they employed also grew more extreme, with officers in some cases “spending hours
perched above public toilets . . . and even following homosexuals and peering through doors into
bedrooms.” 202 Police efforts from 1946 to 1965 are estimated to have led to the arrest of between
two and five thousand individuals each year for sodomy, most of whom engaged in consensual
sexual activity. 203
While the police raided gay bars, state entities like California’s Alcoholic Regulatory
Control Department and the New York State Liquor Authority were empowered to revoke
licenses, and often closed bars if the premises were found to be “a resort for ‘sexual perverts.’” 204
States and municipalities censored literature produced by groups like the Mattachine Society, and
suppressed theater and film depicting or related to same-sex conduct and gay culture. 205
Ultimately, by the mid-1960s, with the gay rights movement on the horizon, gay men faced,
“police harassment, job discrimination, [and] state exclusions.” 206
b. Criminal Law Actions
The 1924 trial of Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb for the brutal murder of Bobby
Franks hardened the association between male same-sex attraction, criminal depravity, and
psychopathy. Highly publicized psychiatric expert testimony about the killers’ “(homo)sexually
perverted desire,” including explicit details about their deviant “symbiotic sexualized
relationship,” produced a media and public frenzy over the trial. 207 Leopold and Loeb, and other
similar criminal cases, 208 spurred a “national hysteria” over child sexual molestation. 209 Between
the World Wars, public officials “increasingly . . . demonized [homosexuals] as threatening to
the Murray Act, “arrested hundreds of men for sodomy, indecent assault and lewdness . . . between 1948 and 1953.” Id. at
64.
202
203

Id. at 64.
Id. at 66.

204

Id. at 79 (“In 1954 Miami adopted an ordinance making it unlawful for a bar to knowingly
employ or sell alcohol to ‘a homosexual person, lesbian or pervert, as the same are commonly accepted and understood, or
to knowingly allow two or more persons who are homosexuals, lesbians or perverts to congregate . . . in his place of
business.’”).
205
206

Id. at 48, 75-77.
Id. at 92.

207

MOGUL et al., supra note 18, at 21 (“Early in the investigation, a teacher at Franks’ school,
‘an effeminate man, whom the police suspected of homosexual tendencies,’ was considered the prime suspect.”).
208

Id. at 27. In addition to their discussion of the Leopold and Loeb case, Mogul et al. explore
a number of queer criminal archetypes. Id. at 26-27. For example, they identify Leopold and Loeb as emblematizing the
“gleeful gay killer[].” Id. at 27. The authors also explore the 1892 murder of Freda Ward by her lover, nineteen-year-old
Alice Mitchell, specifically discussing the media’s obsession with Mitchell’s “purported insanity and [the] intrinsic
violence of [her] gender nonconformity.” Id. at 27-28.
209

See ESKRIDGE, supra note 175, at 40-43 (“[S]ociety increasingly turned to control
homosexuals. . . . Echoing the views of the popular press, [one] judge in 1922 described ‘sexual perverts’ as ‘wild
ferocious animals’ who engaged in a ‘degenerate sexual commerce with little boys or little girls.’ . . . [Soon] [t]he state’s
goals were to control and punish the psychopathic homosexual, to harass and drive underground homosexual communities
and their expression, and to exclude homosexuals from citizenship–all in the name of protecting children from a dangerous
force threatening their development into heterosexuals.”); id. (“American regulation of sexuality shifted after World War I
from a focus on female corruption to a focus on male sexual aggression, reaching an apex after 1935 when child
molestation became a national hysteria.”).
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children whose sexual development was so easily derailed.” 210 State legislators adopted harsher
sodomy laws that provided for incarceration or detainment in mental institutions of “moral
degenerates and sexual perverts.” 211 Under these laws, “[t]he most common . . . conviction [was]
sodomy, including sodomy between consenting adults.” 212 The District of Columbia’s 1948
“Miller Act,” a sodomy law that carried a heavy twenty-year prison sentence, is indicative of the
severity of punishment under similar laws enacted nationwide. 213
3. The Gay Rights Movement, Erosion of Discriminatory Laws and Regulations, and the
Persistence of Caste
The beginning of the gay rights movement, marked by the Stonewall Riots on June 27,
1969, initiated the erosion of laws that discriminated against gay men and lesbian women. 214
After Stonewall, the gay rights movement earned a significant number of legal victories in the
realm of First Amendment rights. 215 By the middle of the 1970s, several cities and counties had
added sexual orientation to their lists of non-discrimination statuses. 216 In addition, the “Civil
Service Commission repealed its ban on homosexual employment in the Federal Civil Service.” 217
During that same period, a number of states decriminalized lesbian and gay intimacy by
reforming or eliminating sodomy laws in conformance with changes to the Model Penal Code
(MPC). 218
Despite legal gains, social stratification persisted. Organizations embraced the ballot
initiative process to repeal pro-gay ordinances: the prime example is the use of the ballot initiative
by Anita Bryant’s “Save Our Children” campaign in 1977 to repeal Dade County, Florida’s fourmonth-old gay rights ordinance. 219 This process was followed by cities in Minnesota, Kansas,
Oregon, and California attempting to repeal their own gay rights ordinances. 220 However, at a
time when many states were removing prohibitions on private consensual sexual activity in line
with the revised MPC, the 1970s also saw a reactionary shift among conservative states, which
attempted to single out same-sex sexual activity for criminal prosecutions. 221 While only nine
210
211
212
213

Id. at 40.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 60.

214

Id. at 99; see also Marty Rouse, Remembering Stonewall: 43 Years Later, HUM. RTS.
CAMPAIGN BLOG, June 28, 2012, http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/remembering-stonewall-43-years-later; William
Rubenstein, The Stonewall Anniversary: 25 Years of Gay Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. 18, 19 (1994).
215
216

Id. at 111-23 (discussing the First Amendment litigation efforts of the gay rights movement).
Id. at 130.

217

Tina Fetner, Working Anita Bryant: The Impact of Christian Anti-Gay Activism on Lesbian
and Gay Movement Claims, 48 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 411, 411 (2001).
218
219

Id. at 414.
Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 258

(1997).
220

Id.

221

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570 (2003). Many state legislatures modernized their entire
system of criminal law when “[i]n 1955 the American Law Institute promulgated the Model Penal Code and made clear
that it did not recommend or provide for ‘criminal penalties for consensual sexual relations conducted in private.’” Id at
572. However, several states’ legislatures “were so appalled to be without a prohibition on homosexual sodomy that they
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states enforced such prohibitions—and by 2003 most of those states were not actively enforcing
those prohibitions—it was not until the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence that a same-sex
couple could engage in private consensual sexual relations without the threat of prosecution.
Furthermore, the 1990s saw the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 222 and of Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell 223 by Congress, which together inhibited the ability of gay men and lesbian
women, both individually and as couples, to enjoy freedoms and privileges equivalent to those
enjoyed by heterosexual persons as a matter of federal law. 224 Viewed along with predecessor
legislation and regulation beginning in the 1920s, these more recent statutes evidence a continuing
pattern of relegating gays and lesbians to a second-class legal status.
4. Does History Indicate a Stratification Created by Laws Based on a Hereditary Characteristic?
From the early criminal prohibitions on sodomy and the first steps by major cities to
impose gender conformity and expel “sexual inverts,” the law has sent a clear message that such
individuals are deviant, different, and less than “typical” heterosexual men and women. 225 As a
consequence of an innate feature of their identity, gay men and lesbian women found themselves
unable to serve in the military if open about their sexuality; participate in the civil service without
fear of persecution; teach in public schools; engage in consensual sexual activity with their
preferred partners; openly socialize with like individuals in private venues; and distribute art and
literature aimed a peer audience. It would appear that the denial to a group of such a wide array
of privileges, freely available to their heterosexual peers, created a level of stratification that
relegated gays and lesbians to second-class social status. From these facts, one could find that a
caste system based on sexual orientation did in fact exist. Even if many of the more divisive
discriminatory laws and regulations have eroded, a system of caste nonetheless persists, as I will
show in the next section.
D. Sexual Orientation and the Exclusive Allocation of Rights
Building on the historical evidence provided above, this section will focus on some of
the rights and privileges currently denied gay men and lesbian women that support the idea that a
caste system not only existed, but also continues to exist. The exclusive allocation of these rights
to a heterosexual majority continues to stratify American society based on sexual orientation,
notably in the area of family law. Family law is interrelated with the legal institution of marriage,

added new laws [specifically] barring [it].” Rubenstein, supra note 214, at 19.
222

Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat 2419 (1996).

223

Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Pub. L. No. 103-160, div. A, title V, § 571(a)(1), 107 Stat. 1547,
1670 (1993), repealed by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, § 2(f)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 3515,
3516 (2010).
224

See, e.g., Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 923 (C.D. Cal.
2010), vacated by Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 658 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell]
denies homosexuals serving in the Armed Forces the right to enjoy ‘intimate conduct’ in their personal relationships” and
“the right to speak about their loved ones while serving their country in uniform; . . . it discharges them for including
information in a personal communication from which an unauthorized reader might discern their homosexuality.”); see
also, Judge Rules “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy Unconstitutional, ABC NEWS, Sept. 10, 2010,
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/ 2010/09/judge-rules-dont-ask-dont-tell-policy-unconstitutional/.
225

See ESKRIDGE, supra note 175, at 18.
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which is in reality “a bundle of rights and obligations pertaining to how each member of the
couple must treat each other and how outsiders must treat the couple.” 226 Numerous rights
accompany marriage at both the federal and state levels, 227 but I will touch on just a few: taxes,
inheritance and intestacy, testimonial privilege, and adoption.
1. Federal Taxes
Federal taxes are used to incentivize and shape marriage. Prominently, the joint tax
return, “available also for state income taxes, treats married couples as one taxpaying unit.” 228
DOMA defines marriage for the purposes of federal law as being between one man and one
woman, 229 and thus the IRS does not recognize same-sex marriages for federal income, gift, or
estate tax purposes. 230 For this reason, “gay and lesbian couples must file as single people on
their federal tax returns.” 231 This distinct treatment creates significant problems for same-sex
couples who live in states that recognize same-sex marriage and so must complete state tax forms
as a married couple but federal tax forms as individuals. 232 Perhaps even more significantly, the
federal tax code “forces [same-sex] parents that share a home, meals, and parenting
responsibilities to break their family apart to file separate tax forms.” 233
Federal tax law denies same-sex couples tax benefits in property transfers given to other
married couples as “[f]ederal law uses marriage as a way to defer tax obligations when an affluent
individual dies leaving a widowed spouse, who inherits [assets and property].” 234 Where
“[p]roperty transfers between spouses are not subject to gain-loss valuation,” 235 federal estate tax
226

Katharine K. Baker, The Stories of Marriage, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 5, 6 (2010) (“These
rights and obligations usually include, inter alia, the right to receive a portion of a spouse’s estate if she dies intestate, the
right to bring a wrongful death action, the right to access spousal health, disability and accident insurance plans, the right
to assert evidentiary privileges, the right to hospital visitation and other incidents relevant to medical treatment of a family
member, and the entitlements and responsibilities pertaining to spousal maintenance and marital property at separation.”).
227

See ABA Section of Family Law, A White Paper: An Analysis of the Law Regarding SameSex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 38 FAM. L.Q. 339, 366 (2004) (“More than one thousand rights
and responsibilities are automatically accorded to couples based on marital status.”); Anita Bernstein, For and Against
Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 146 (2003) (describing how a search by the General Accounting Office
identified 1,049 federal laws that condition rights on marital status).
228
229

Bernstein, supra note 227, at 146.
Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).

230

See Keeva Terry, Same-Sex Relationships, DOMA, and the Tax Code: Rethinking the
Relevance of DOMA to Straight Couples, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 384, 392-93 (2011) (“Individuals who are not
married for federal income tax purposes are not permitted to file jointly. Married filing separately has a completely
different and less beneficial rate structure than the filing categories for single persons who are not married for federal
income tax purposes.”) (emphasis omitted).
231

Frederick Hertz, Tax Issues for Same-Sex Couples, NOLO, http://nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/tax-issues-same-sex-gay-couples-32290.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2012).
232

Id.

233

Tara Siegel Bernard, Some Tax Breaks Unavailable to Same-Sex Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
16,
2012,
http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/16/some-tax-breaks-unavailable-to-same-sex-couples
(quoting
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, FAMILY EQUAL. COUNCIL & CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, UNEQUAL TAXATION
AND UNDUE BURDENS FOR LGBT FAMILIES 9 (Apr. 2012)).
234
235

Bernstein, supra note 227, at 146-47.
Id.
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laws force “[s]ame-sex couples [to] face federal marginal tax rates of up to 45% on the bequest of
assets to their surviving partner at death that exceed an excluded amount per estate . . . .” 236 Thus,
for an “equivalent transfer, married couples pay no taxes,” where same-sex couples must pay
sizeable taxes. 237
2. Inheritance and Intestacy
While an individual can bequeath his or her property at death to whomever he or she
would like, same-sex couples find themselves disadvantaged when a partner dies intestate. When
a married person dies holding assets, his or her spouse will almost certainly inherit at least a
portion of those assets, unless the surviving spouse waived claims:
Many states forbid the disinheriting of spouses, and all of them establish wives
and husbands as default beneficiaries when decedents die without a will. . . .
Married decedents who die intestate may not have intended to leave money to
their wives or husbands, but the state in effect chooses to write a will benefiting
these widowed spouses. 238
While some states have recognized same-sex couples as equivalent to married couples or
have accepted out of state same-sex marriage licenses for the purposes of wills and inheritance, 239
most have not. Consequently, in those states, “intestacy laws protect only the rights of lawfully
married survivors, and in states that do not recognize same-sex marriages or civil unions, the
estate will be distributed to distant relatives, or even escheat to the state, rather than benefit the
surviving partner” to the same-sex marriage, union, or long-standing relationship. 240

236

MICHAEL D. STEINBERGER, FEDERAL ESTATE TAX DISADVANTAGES FOR SAME-SEX
COUPLES 1 (2009), available at https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/09cv2292/evidence/PX1269.pdf.
237
238

Id.
Bernstein, supra note 227, at 149.

239

See, e.g., Peter C. Valente & Susan P. Witkin, Estate Planning Issues for Same-Sex Spouses,
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 4, 2011, at 3, available at http://blankrome.com/index.cfm?contentID=37&itemID=2376 (citing Matter of
Ranftle, 917 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) for its holding “that a same-sex spouse is a ‘spouse’ for purposes of
New York’s intestacy laws”); see also Kathy T. Graham, Same-Sex Couples: Their Rights as Parents, and Their
Children’s Rights as Children, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 999, 1002 (2008) (citing Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (“[B]arring an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage
solely because that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution.”)).
240

Christine A. Hammerle, Free Will to Will? A Case for the Recognition of Intestacy Rights
for Survivors to a Same-Sex Marriage or Civil Union, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1763, 1764 (2006). The author notes,
Although effective testamentary planning would obviate the need for recognition of same-sex
intestacy rights, it has some possible shortcomings. Relying on wills to accurately reflect a
decedent’s intent is problematic for three reasons: relatives of the decedent may successfully
challenge a will leaving most or all of the estate to a same-sex partner, a home-drawn will may fail
for defects in execution, or couples in a civil union or same-sex marriage may neglect to make wills
at all, assuming that their union or marital status will protect them in the event one dies.
Id. at 1768.
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3. Evidentiary Privileges in State and Federal Courts
In federal courts, “[u]ntil 1933, a married person was deemed incompetent to testify in
favor of his spouse. . . .” 241 In the Federal Rules of Evidence, this common law notion
has been replaced by evidentiary rules that make being married a source of
power for witnesses and parties to litigation. Two significant marital privileges
have endured: the privilege to exclude adverse spousal testimony, and the
confidential marital communications privilege. . . . [Such] communications are
absolutely privileged from disclosure, and either spouse may invoke the
privilege. 242
However, “under the federal Defense of Marriage Act, federal statutes and regulations
that provide special treatment to marriages or spouses apply only to opposite-sex marriages.” 243
In the context of Federal Rule of Evidence 501, DOMA limits the ability of a federal judge to
recognize marital privileges between same-sex spouses in cases arising under federal law. 244
Where a federal court presides over a criminal case, a same-sex spouse (or partner under a civil
union) who refuses to testify as a witness may be compelled to testify against his or her
significant other or face being held in civil contempt or prosecuted for criminal contempt. 245
Perhaps of greater concern, “if the prosecution successfully compels the testimony, the accused
may be convicted and incarcerated based on evidence that arguably should have been
excluded.” 246
Presently, “[i]n thirteen states, a person can stop his or her spouse from testifying
adversely. The broader confidential-communications privilege covers disclosure between
husbands and wives in the confidence of the marital relationship.” 247 Similar to the federal
system, states have created significant barriers for same-sex spouses who try to assert evidentiary
privileges intended to protect the marital institution by enacting both evidentiary laws that provide
for spousal privilege and also their own versions of the Defense of Marriage Act (sometimes
called “mini-DOMAs”). 248
241
242

Bernstein, supra note 227, at 148.
Id.

243

Eugene Volokh, Same-Sex Marriages, the Spousal Privilege Not To Testify, and Iowa vs.
Federal Law, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 29, 2009, 2:44 PM), http://volokh.com/2009/10/29/same-sex-marriagesthe-spousal-privilege-not-to-testify-and-iowa-vs-federal-law/.
244

See John Bergstresser, Note, When Evidentiary Rules Enforce Substantive Policies: SameSex Marital Privilege Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 in Diversity Cases, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 303 (2012) (“[O]ne
of DOMA’s greatest consequences is that the evidentiary rights available to same-sex spouses under state law would be
ignored when litigation proceeds in federal rather than state court.”).
245

See Maria A. La Vita, Note, When the Honeymoon is Over: How a Federal Court’s Denial
of the Spousal Privilege to a Legally Married Same-Sex Couple Can Result in the Incarceration of a Spouse Who Refuses
to Adversely Testify, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 243, 245 (2007).
246
247

Id.
Bernstein, supra note 227, at 152.

248

See Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom & W. James Denvil, Availability of Spousal Privileges for SameSex Couples, 11 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 224-26, 235 (2012) (“The law of evidence has
recognized two distinct marital privileges, which are designed to protect marital unions. The first of these privileges, the
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4. Adoption
Adoption is another area in which individual gays and lesbians and same-sex couples are
legally disadvantaged relative to their heterosexual peers. A same-sex couple can become parents
via two routes: the couple “may petition jointly to adopt a child who is not biologically related to
either [partner]” or one partner can petition to adopt the child of his or her same-sex partner. 249
The latter is referred to as a second-parent adoption, “a legal procedure that allows a same-sex
parent to adopt his or her partner’s biological or adoptive child without terminating the legal
rights of the first parent.” 250 In this way, legislators and courts have continued to “expand the
legal definition of the American family.” 251 This changing understanding of family has led to the
erosion of legislation denying same-sex couples the ability to adopt. 252 For instance, Arkansas
and Florida recently struck down laws categorically prohibiting lesbians and gay individuals from
adopting children. 253
Nonetheless, a significant disparity between same-sex and different-sex couples persists
within state adoption law. Mississippi stands alone as the only state that continues to have a legal
code that outright denies the ability of “couples of the same gender” to adopt. 254 Yet other states
continue to deny same-sex couples the right to adopt through less explicit means. Utah’s adoption
law prevents adoption by a couple that “is not [in] a legally valid and binding marriage under
[state law].” 255 Thus, unless Utah chooses to allow for same-sex marriage, a same-sex couple

‘anti-marital facts privilege,’ which is available only in criminal cases in some jurisdictions, protects one spouse from
being compelled to testify against the other during the marriage. The second, the ‘confidential communications privilege,’
protects spouses from having their confidential marital communications disclosed in legal proceedings. . . . One must be
married, of course, to avail oneself of these evidentiary privileges. Therefore, [in many states and in federal court,] the
privileges [are] not available to same-sex couples . . . .”).
249

Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Adoption of Child by Same-Sex Partners, 61 A.L.R. 6th 1
(2011). See also Id. § 9 (surveying case law of adoptions by lesbian and gay persons and couples).
250

NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION IN THE U.S. (2008),
available at http://outfront.org/files/pg332/Secondparentadoption.pdf; see also NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS,
ADOPTION BY LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL PARENTS: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW (2012), available at
http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/adptn0204.pdf?docID=1221.
251

Rachel L. Swarns, Male Couples Face Pressure to Fill Cradles, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2012,

at A1.
252

See Wooster, supra note 249, at §2 (“A . . . dwindling number of states have laws or policies
prohibiting or restricting adoption by lesbian or gay people while increasing numbers of jurisdictions have enacted explicit
provisions prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in adoption.”).
253

Id. §24; see also David Knowles, Florida Gay Adoption Ban Overturned, but 3 States Still
Restrict It, AOL NEWS SURGE DESK, Sept. 22, 2010, http://aolnews.com/2010/09/22/florida-gay-adoption-ban-overturnedbut-3-states-still-restrict/; Amanda Terkel, Arkansas Supreme Court Strikes Down Ban On Gay Adoptions, HUFFINGTON
POST, June 7, 2011, http://huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/07/arkansas-supreme-court-ban-gay-adoption_n_846174.html.
254

MISS. CODE. ANN. § 93-17-3 (2012) (“Adoption by couples of the same gender is

prohibited.”).
255

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117 (LexisNexis 2012). In relevant part, Utah’s minor adoption

law states:
(1) A minor child may be adopted by an adult person, in accordance with the provisions and
requirements of this section and this part.
(2) A child may be adopted by:
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cannot adopt there. In addition, “[s]tate courts in Michigan have ruled that unmarried individuals
may not jointly petition to adopt.” 256 Second-parent adoptions have also faced significant
challenges. Courts in Kentucky, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Ohio have ruled second-parent
adoptions impermissible under current state law. 257
Furthermore, where a state has not outright legislatively or judicially addressed the issue
of same-sex adoption (either joint or second-parent), “prospective adoptive parents who are
lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender . . . still encounter discrimination during the adoption
process.” 258 According to the Human Rights Campaign, only eighteen states and the District of
Columbia explicitly allow same sex couples to adopt through joint adoption, and in Colorado and
Minnesota, same-sex couples have been able to successfully petition to adopt in some
jurisdictions. 259 Only twenty-one states and the District of Columbia expressly provide for
second-parent adoption or offer a stepparent alternative. 260 In the remaining states, adoption
statutes are often vague, providing significant room for judicial discretion. In allowing for such
case-by-case analysis, same-sex couples are made victims to the subjective prejudices of the
specific evaluator. 261
5. Present-day indicators of a caste system
The evidence provided above clearly indicates societal segmentation. These legal issues
taken individually may be insufficient to establish a system of caste. However, when viewed
collectively and in combination with the historical treatment of gay men and lesbian women under
the law, one could determine that a system of caste has historically been present and continues to
exist. Though the denial of certain tax benefits or greater difficulties in the adoption process may
not be akin to having a police officer follow an individual home and peer into his or her bedroom,
these disparities nonetheless support the assertion that gays and lesbians face a second-class
status. Part IV addresses how denying same-sex marriage further perpetuates that system, and
thus violates the original meaning of Section One.

(a) adults who are legally married to each other in accordance with the laws of this state, including
adoption by a stepparent; or
(b) subject to Subsection (4), any single adult, except as provided in Subsection (3).
(3) A child may not be adopted by a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally
valid and binding marriage under the laws of this state.
Id. (emphasis added).
256

HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, PARENTING LAWS: JOINT ADOPTION (Jan. 6, 2012), available at
http:// hrc.org/files/assets/resources/Joint_Adoption_parenting_Laws_April_2011.pdf [hereinafter HRC: JOINT PARENT
ADOPTION].
257

Id.; NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, supra note 250 (citing In re Adoption of Luke,
640 N.W.2d 374 (Neb. 2002); In re Adoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); and Interest of Angel Lace
M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994)); see also S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).
258
259
260

Wooster, supra note 249, at § 2, § 2 n. 8.
HRC: JOINT PARENT ADOPTION, supra note 256.
NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 250.

261

See HRC: JOINT PARENT ADOPTION, supra note 256 (“In many states the status of parenting
law for LGBT people is unclear. The determination of parenting rights is always made on a case-by-case basis and it is
ultimately the decision of the judge whether to grant the adoption petition.”).
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IV. DENYING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE MAY BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A
VIOLATION OF THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
This final part explores the implications for originalism of finding the original meaning
of Section One to be a prohibition on either caste or class legislation on the same-sex marriage
question. I aim to support the proposition that an originalist could find that denying marriage to
same-sex couples violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore that laws prohibiting samesex couples from entering into a legally binding marriage are unconstitutional.
A. Denying Same-Sex Marriage Under the Fourteenth Amendment as a Prohibition on Caste
As set out in Part II above, the original meaning of Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment may be a broad prohibition on systems of caste. A system of caste stratifies society
on the basis of a hereditary characteristic, and exclusively allocates rights to one group while
denying those same rights to another. Part III provides evidence to show that a caste system
grounded on sexual orientation exists in the United States. Such a system exists if one is
persuaded that (1) sexual orientation is at least partially hereditary; (2) the existence and impact of
direct and indirect statutes and regulations based on sexual orientation indicate a history of class
legislation which relegated gays and lesbians to second class citizenship; and (3) despite erosion
of this caste system, there are still many areas today in which different-sex couples are allocated
rights and privileges to the exclusion of same-sex couples. Therefore, an original meaning
originalist may find first, that sexual orientation has been and continues to be the basis of a system
of caste and class legislation; and second, that legislation predicated on that feature is
unconstitutional. Extending this rationale, such an originalist could conclude that laws denying
marriage (or an equivalent bundle of rights) to same-sex couples are counter to the original
meaning of Section One and are therefore unconstitutional.
To maintain the present allocation of rights would seem to require an alternative
justification for why these rights and privileges should be denied to same-sex couples. 262 One
argument is that gay men and lesbian women are not being denied an equal, reciprocal right to
marry. They have the right to marry someone of the opposite sex and enjoy all the rights that
come with that union.
Such arguments are merely a modern twist on the “separate but equal” rationale that
preserved anti-miscegenation laws in cases like Pace v. Alabama, 263 and was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia. 264 In Loving, the state of Virginia argued,
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, as illuminated by the statements of
the Framers, is only that state penal laws containing an interracial element as
part of the definition of the offense must apply equally to [the races, such that]
members of each race are punished to the same degree . . . [and] because its
262

In Windsor v. United States, the government argued that one reason why the Defense of
Marriage Act should be preserved is “[f]iscal prudence” because expanding the group entitled to spousal government
benefits would be an increased strain on the federal budget. 699 F.3d 169, 186 (2d Cir. 2012). The Second Circuit
rejected this argument. Id. at 186-87. Nonetheless, perhaps a similar type of argument would not fall within the scope of
the Fourteenth Amendments prohibition on systems of caste and class legislation.
263
264

106 U.S. 583 (1883).
388 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1967).
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miscegenation statutes punish equally both the white and the Negro participants
in an interracial marriage, these statutes . . . do not [violate this original
meaning]. 265
The Warren Court rejected Virginia’s argument on non-originalist grounds, and
originalism has struggled to find anti-miscegenation within the scope of Section One. 266
Professor Steven Calabresi has responded to critics of the non-originalist arguments in Loving by
explaining how the outcome in Loving was nonetheless proper under an original meaning
originalist approach. 267 He argues that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 ensured that
citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of
slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and property . . . 268
If one accepts that marriage is a civil legal contract, 269 then, as Calabresi asserts, “[i]f an
African American man is told that he can legally enter into a marriage contract with only an
African American woman and not a white woman . . . his ability to make marriage contracts has

265

Id. at 7-8.

266

From the standpoint of originalism, the process by which the Warren Court reached their
conclusion in Loving is questionable. See, e.g. Jack Balkin, Scalia’s Biggest Problem isn’t Brown, It’s Bolling and
Loving, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 28, 2009, 7:35 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/10/scalias-biggest-problem-isntbrown-its.html (“[T]he Supreme Court overturned the rule of Pace in Loving v. Virginia, decided in 1967 during the high
water mark of the Warren Court. The Court dodged the history . . . by claiming that it was inconclusive (which is not the
case).”).
Others have noted the difficulty of explaining the holding in Loving through an originalist lens by focusing on
the historical evidence indicating that prohibitions on interracial marriage were not intended by the drafters of the Equal
Protection Clause. Kermit T. Roosevelt III, Interpretation and Construction: Originalism and Its Discontents, 34 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 102 n.15 (2011) (“It is about as plain as such things can be, for instance, that the ratifiers of the
Equal Protection Clause did not think it would immediately create a right to interracial marriage, which the colorblindness
approach does.”). See also Josh Blackman, Balkin’s Right, Scalia’s Wrong. Bolling v. Sharpe and Loving v. VA bigger
Originalist Quandary than Brown, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Oct. 28, 2009), http://joshblogs.wordpress.com/2009/10/
28/balkins-right-scalias-wrong-bolling-v-sharpe-and-loving-v-va-bigger-originalist-quandry-than-brown/ (“How can the
federal government possibly be mandated to enforce equal protection under an originalist jurisprudence. Further, how can
[a] miscegenation ban . . . possibly be unconstitutional if it was a common at the time of Reconstruction.”).
267
268

Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 46, at 3-4.
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006) (emphasis added).

269

Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 46, at 60 n.91; see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 432-33 (1893) (“Our law considers marriage in no other light than as a civil contract. . . . [T]he law treats
it as it does all other contracts . . . .”). Furthermore, both a modern dictionary and one from the time of ratification
recognize marriage as a civil contract agreement. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 897 (9th ed. 2009); Marriage
Definition, ARTFL
PROJECT:
WEBSTER’S
UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY
1828,
http://machaut.uchicago.edu/?action=search&word=Marriage&resource= Webster%27s&quicksearch=on (“Marriage is a
contract both civil and religious . . . .”) (last visited Dec. 21, 2012).
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been abridged.” 270 To impair the “liberty of contract” in such a way would be “blatantly
unconstitutional.” 271 Extending this framework to sexual orientation and same-sex marriage, if
we accept that the Fourteenth Amendment not only “at a bare minimum . . . constitutionalized the
Civil Rights Act of 1866” 272 but also went beyond race, one could find that denying an individual
the freedom to enter into a marriage contract (a legal agreement that includes a “bundle of rights”)
with whomever he or she likes, purely on the basis of sexual orientation, is also unconstitutional.
B. Denying Same-Sex Marriage Under the Fourteenth Amendment as a Prohibition of Partial or
Special Class Legislation
As addressed above, another possible original meaning of Section One is that it
constitutionalized the state court practice of prohibiting “special” or “partial” legislation—laws
that single out certain persons or groups for special burdens or benefits without adequate
justification. 273 It may be that either explicitly denying same-sex marriage in legislation, or
affirming that only marriage between persons of different sexes will be entitled to legal
recognition, violates this principle.
On the one hand, such legislation could be viewed as singling out same-sex couples to
place on them the “special burden” of being unable to enter into a legally binding marital
relationship with the person they love. Conversely, such laws could be understood as singling out
different-sex couples for the special benefit of the privilege of entering into a legally binding
marital relationship with the person they love. From either perspective, the law in this area is not
“operat[ing] equally upon all persons.” 274
For reasons discussed in the previous section, one could make the argument that by
providing gay men and lesbian women the ability to enter into different-sex marital relationships,
the law does not single out any group for a special disadvantage. Yet that ignores reality: whereas
different-sex couples have the commitment to the person they love recognized by law, and are
accorded rights and privileges as a result, same-sex couples are denied that opportunity. At a
minimum, there is a “special burden” on same-sex couples to enter into legal arrangements
(contracts, trusts, wills, etc.) to even try and approximate the benefits of a legally binding
marriage between people of different sexes.
A caveat exists for partial legislation when an adequate justification is present, usually
based on some general societal benefit: such legislation cannot be arbitrary. The state courts from
which this principle was adopted “understood that the imposition of special benefits and burdens
was often necessary to promote the general welfare, and . . . were willing to tolerate laws singling
out certain persons . . . for special treatment when they could be justified on this ground.” 275
However, arguments in favor of denying same-sex marriage as a matter of general
welfare are often predicated on ignorance, such as a fear of gay or lesbian recruitment, or blanket
assertions such as “[t]he decline of marriage over the past few decades has reduced the number of
men who are helping women raise their children . . . [and] [s]ame-sex marriage likely will
270
271
272
273
274
275

Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 46, at 30.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 23.
Saunders, supra note 105, at 247-48.
Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
Id. at 260.
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contribute to this decline, even among heterosexual men.” 276 Another common argument is that
“marriage is ordered toward the procreation of children” and so legal supports are given to
marriage to protect these interests “because society must be concerned about its own preservation
and continuity into the next generation.” 277 Yet, the notion that same-sex marriage poses a threat
to procreation seems to misunderstand the nature of same-sex relationships and their influence on
the family. The American Physiological Association has resolved that “there is no scientific
evidence that parenting effectiveness is related to parental sexual orientation: lesbian and gay
parents are as likely as heterosexual parents to provide supportive and healthy environments for
their children.” 278 Even legally grounded arguments appear weak relative to the privilege being
denied. For instance, one might argue that legalizing same-sex marriage necessitates significant
revisions of the tax code or require expansion of school curriculums. 279
There may very well be persuasive arguments against same-sex marriage. For instance,
some might be convinced that preservation of tradition is a sufficient general welfare justification
for restricting marriage as an institution exclusively to heterosexuals. Nevertheless, as a matter of
application, whatever arguments are put forward must survive a complex inquiry to establish that
the general welfare principal is satisfied. Essentially, this inquiry is comparable to the strict or
heightened scrutiny analysis the Supreme Court has adopted under its existing Equal Protection
precedents, and is therefore far from the “easy” case that Justice Scalia and others might assume.
Absent an argument that supports complete denial of marriage to same-sex couples as a matter of
general welfare, an originalist would be compelled to find such a law as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on partial or special legislation.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia has asserted that same-sex marriage is an easy case. The Constitution, in
his view, could not possibly sanction same-sex conduct, much less same-sex unions. Yet, under
the “new originalist” framework put forward in this piece, even if this is an easy question for
Justice Scalia, it may not be so easy for originalism. As Randy Barnett explains, “[t]he intuitive
appeal of originalism rests on the proposition that the original public meaning is an objective fact
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that can be established by reference to historical materials.” 280 From those historical materials,
one may find that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is to serve as a prohibition
on systems of caste and class legislation, with those terms being synonymous. Alternatively, one
could find the original meaning to be a prohibition on class legislation defined as partial or special
legislation.
If the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a prohibition on systems of caste, then laws
stratifying society based on hereditary characteristics are constitutionally impermissible. If the
scientific research presented above is correct, then the extensive history of laws directly and
indirectly targeting gay men and lesbian women may establish such a system. Further, laws
prohibiting marriage of same-sex couples (or limiting marriage and/or an equivalent bundle of
rights to different-sex couples) could be an impermissible and unconstitutional perpetuation of
that system, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. If the original meaning prohibits special
or partial legislation that singles out a particular group for a unique burden or allocates a special
privilege, such laws would likewise violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Resolving the issue of same-sex marriage for originalism will require answering other
complex questions. For instance, is there something fundamentally unique about marriage that
renders it more than a normal legal agreement? 281 Does the anti-caste command extend to
marriage? Does the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee a right to marriage at all? Is preserving
tradition necessary to promote general welfare? There are certainly many arguments for and
against what I propose here. 282 Nonetheless, a case can be made for how originalism may find
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See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 70, at 152 (“The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
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Oddly, Calabresi argues that because there has not been a constitutional amendment akin to the Nineteenth or
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that denying same-sex couples the right to marry is unconstitutional. Perhaps it is not such an
easy question for originalism after all.

Fifteenth Amendments extending political rights explicitly to the gay community, the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be
read to require complete equal allocation of civil rights to that group. Id. at 153. I contend that Calabresi is misguided—
the circumstances simply are not analogous. The Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments were required to provide political
rights where, first for blacks and then for women, none had existed before. However, individuals have never been outright
denied political rights based on sexual orientation. Presumably, gay, white, property-owning men have always had full
political rights. Therefore, following Calabresi’s logic, if the LGBT community has full political rights today—which
they do—then no amendment is required and to deny them any of the less restricted civil rights would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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